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ASSESSING THE ADVOCACY OF 
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: 
A RESPONSE TO PHILIP HA~.RTER 
CAR Y C oGLIA N ESE* 
For many years. advocates of negotiated rul e n1 ak ing have 
made enthusiastic claims about how negoti ated rul emaking 
would " break impasses," "cure malaise ," and " bypass lawyers" in 
the administra tive process.l Strikingly, such advocates have ex-
pressed lit tle interes t over the years in systematica lly testing their 
claims by assessing the effectiveness of negotiated rul em aking 
against existing rul em akjng processes. My resea rch . in contrast , 
aims to do just th at. Beginning several years ago , I set forth to 
tes t the widely stated claims about the superiority o f negoti ated 
rulemaking for preventing litigation and saving time in the regu-
la tory process.2 Following exacting and transparent standards of 
empirical evaluation, my research demonstrates all too clea rly 
that negotiated rulemaking has fail ed to meet these tvvo promi-
nent goals. It neither saves time nor reduces liti gation. 3 
'' Associate Professor of Public Policy. Harvard University. John F. 
Kennedy School o l" Government ; Chair of the Regulatory Po licy Program, 
Center for Business and Government: and Affiliated Scholar. Harvard Law 
School. The preparati on of this response was supported in part by the Sa vitz 
Fa mily Fund for Envi ro nment and Natural Reso urces Policy a t the Kennedy 
School of Government. I am grateful for research assistance from Curt James 
and Matthew Salloway, and for helpful comments from Steven Balla. Derek 
Bok. Tom Burke, Jane Fo untain . David H art. David Laze r, and Jenni fe r Nash. 
I See, e.g .. LAWR E?'-iC E SussKI ND & JEFFREY CR UIKSH AN K. BRE AK ir" Ci T H E 
l MP."\ SSE: CoNSENSlj/\L A PPROACHES TO R ESOLV ING Pu BLI C DI SPUTES ( 1987): 
Philip J. Hart er, N egoliming Regulations: A Cure f or lvfa la ise. 7 l Cr::o. L.J. I 
(1 982) [here ina fte r Harter, Cure for J\l a/aise ]; Lawrence Susskin d & La ura Van 
D am, Squoring Ojf m rh e Tab le, N ot in the Courts, T EC H. R Ev .. July 1986. at 36: 
William H . klill er, Bypassing rhe Lawyers: "R egulawry Negorimion .. Gers Tcsr 
in Agencies , INo us . W K., June 23, 1986, at 20. 
2 Ca ry Cogli anese, Assessing Consensus: Th e Pro111ise and Performance of 
Negori([[e d Rulenwking, 46 D uKE L.J. 1255, 1259 (1 997) [here in after Cog-
li anese, A ssessing Consensus ]. See also Cary Coglianese, i s Consensus an Ap-
propriate B asis fo r Regulatory Policy?, in ENVI RONMENT;\ L CoNTR,•\CTs: 
CorvJP,\R;\TI VE AP PROACHES TO REGU LATO RY INNOVATION IN THE UN ITED 
STATES ;\N D EuRO PE 93 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eels .. 200 1) [herei naft er 
Coglianese . Is Consensus Appropriare? ]. 
J Coglianese, A ssessing Consensus, sup ru note 2. at 1278- 1309. 
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In an essay published in the previous issue of this journaL 
Philip Harter, a seasoned mediator and longtime advocate of ne -
gotiated rulemaking,-~ offers a critical response to my research, 
asserting that negotiated rulemaking '"has been remarkably suc-
cessful in fulfilling its promise . " 5 'vVhile it is perhaps predictable 
that Harter would continue to advocate for negotiated rulemak-
ing. his response to my rese arch fai ls to mee t ordinary, neutral 
standards for empirical social science. He repeated ly interprets 
data to fa vor nego tiated rulemaking. 6 TI1is may we ll be under-
standab le as a form of advocacy, but it does not satisfy appropri-
ate standards for making sound empirical judgments.7 Harter 
makes un founded asse rtio ns about my stud y, disregards basic 
principles of empirica l analysis, and continues to advance bold 
claims for negotiated rulemaking unsupported by re liable empiri-
cal analysis.s In short Harter is simply wrong about each of the 
'-~ In 1982. Harter authored a widely-cited articl e advocating negotiated 
rulemaking. Haner. Cure fin Malaise. supra note 1. TI1is work formed the ba-
sis for the Administrative Confere nce of the United Sta tes' recommendation in 
favor o f nego tiated rulem ak ing. R ecom mendati on 82-4 , Procedures for Negoti-
ating Proposed Regul ati ons , 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 [hereinafter ACUS, Proce-
dures for Nego tiating]. reprinred in AD r-viiN ISTR/\TIVE CoNFERENCE OF TI IF 
UNITED STi\TES. NEGOTii\TED R uu -:: MAK ING SouRCEBOOK 11 (David M. 
Pritzkcr & Deborah S. Dalton eels., 1995) [hereinaft er ACUS, 1995 
SouR CEBOC>K]. Harter has since served as a convenor and facilit ator in numer-
ous negotiated rukmakings . authored oth er art icles advocating the process. and 
testified bdore Congress in favo r of its expanded use. 
5 Philip J. H arte r. Assessing rhe Assessors: The Acwal Pe1:fonnance of Ne-
goriared Rulemaking. C) N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 (2000) [hereinafter Harter, 
Assessing rhe A ssessors ]. Harter previously published similar criticisms of my 
research . Philip Harter, Fcor of Conznzirnzenr: An Affliction o f Adolescenrs. 46 
D uKE L.J. 1389. 142 1-22 & 1422 n.l l 7 (1 997) [h ereinafter Hart er. Fear of 
Conznzitmenr ]. 
6 Th is is. of cou rse, not th e first time Harter has presented an unb alanced 
account of negotiated ru lemaking. In his origin al 11 3-page article advocating 
negoti ated rulemaking in lLJ82 . Harte r devoted less than two pages to a consid-
era tion of '·possib le adve rse consequences" of nego tiated rul emaking. di s-
missing any fea rs abo ut such potential drawbacks as "exaggerated." H arte r. 
Cure fo r lvfaloisc. supra note l. at 110-12 (emphasis added). 
7 It may also. of course. be understandable as a matter of ordin ary psychol-
ogy. See RI CHARD NisBETT & LEE Ross . H uMAN INFERENCE: STRATEC IES 
AND SHORTCO!v!INGS o r Soc:JAL JUDGM ENT 192 ( 1980) (noting the tendency of 
individuals to adhere to th eir bel iefs "well beyond th e point at which logical and 
evidential conside rati ons can sustain them'· and to apply "asymmetric critical 
stan dards to supportive and opposing evidence"). 
s Each of th ese problems is discussed in the subseq uent Parts of th is Arti -
cl e. To pick one example of the la st of these problems. Harter conc ludes in his 
recent art icle th at --[r]eg-neg has proven to be an en ormously powerful tool in 
addressing hi gh ly comple x. politicized rules. th e very kind that stall agencies 
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many criticisms he levels against my research. Not one of his 
claims undercuts my original fin dings in any way. 
Although Harter's criticisms are without merit , they deserve 
a response for the same reason that negotiated rulemaking and 
other administrative innovations need evaluation in the fir st 
place: negotiated rulemaking places significant new demands on 
those inside and outside of government and it can present poten-
tially significant obstacles to the development of sound public 
policyY Before recommending that agencies increase their reli-
ance on negotiated rulemaking, it only makes sense to assess 
whether this alternative procedure has achieved its goals and 
made any demonstrable improvement over existing regulatory 
practices. 10 In the absence of careful, systematic research , con-
scientious agency officials have no reliable way to evaluate nego-
tiation advocates' claims and to det ermine whether one set of 
procedures performs better than the alternatives. 11 
when traditional or conventional procedures are used. " Harter. Assessing rh e 
Assessors , supra no te 5, at 56 . As support, Harter simply cite s a n inte rview with 
another lon g-standin g advoca te of negotiated rule m aking. ld. at 56 n . Ll 7 (c it -
in g interview with Neil Eisne r of the Department o f Transportation). Othe r 
negotiation profess ionals have ri ghtfull y disparaged such use of " advocacy sc i-
e nce,'· by whi ch those whose interes ts a re affected by scientific research resor t 
to "smokescree n" and "slash a nd burn ,. tac tics to chall enge the studies they find 
adve rse and to promote alternative studies tha t would see m to support th e ir 
interes ts. See, e.g., LAWRENCE Suss Ktl"D & P ATR ICK FIELD, D EALINC> WITt! AN 
A NG RY PUBLI C: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO R ESO LVING DI SPUTES 8-
12 (1996) (discussing "smokescreen " and ·'s lash and burn" public re la tions 
ploys): Susskind & Van D am . supra note l, at 38 (complaining that "Advocacy 
scie nce ... [is] e roding the credibility of all sci e ntific tes tim ony in p ublic 
d isputes." ) . 
9 See, e.g., Cogli anese, Is Consensus Approprime?. supra n o te 2 , at I 06- i 3: 
Michael McCloskey, Problell7s 1virh Using Collnbo ro tion to Shape Environm en -
tal Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. R Ev . 423 , 434 (2000) (arguing that conse nsus-
building " is a cumbe rsom e process that is phguecl by disad vantages that out-
weigh[] its perceived advantages .'' ) . 
IO In this way, careful atte ntion to the impact of negotiated rulemaking o n 
its promine nt go al s of preve nting litiga ti on and savi ng time in the regulato ry 
process is consiste nt with the principles unde rlying the Government Perform-
ance a nd R esults Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-62. 107 Stat. 285 (cod ified as 
a mended in sca ttered secti ons of 5 U.S.C. & 39 U.S.C.) (promoting agency eva l-
uation of the results of gove rnmen t programs). 
II As Neil Ke rwin h as observed. "[t]he p urported superiority of consensual 
processes ove r clec isionmaking techniques th at e mploy m e th ods outlined in th e 
APA . .. cannot be established by me re positing of generalities and abstrac-
tions.·' Corne liu s M. Kerwin . Assessing th e Ej(ects of Consensual Processes in 
Regulatory Programs: M erlwdo!ogica / ond Policy Issues , 32 Aivl. U . L. REv. 401, 
409 (1983) . 
I 
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T11is Article proceeds to show why Harter's criticisms miss 
their target and fail to weaken my original findings . In Part I , I 
provide a summary of my original research and briet1y review 
some elementary principles of research that apply to any empiri-
cal evaluation. Since negotiated rulemaking has long been ad-
vertised as a "cure'' for regulatory ills, its effectiveness should be 
evaluated as neutrally as any potential cure fo r illness should be 
evaluated. The remaining parts of this Article are organized 
around the three principal arguments H arter advances . He criti-
cizes the way I measure the length of the rulemaking process , 
claims that I fail to appreciate differences in litigation, and sug-
gests that , in any case, my results do not matter since negotiated 
rul emaking achieves demonstrably be tter rules than existing reg-
ulatory practices. In Part II, I reply to Harter' s criticisms of my 
measure of the duration of negotiated rulem akings , explaining in 
particular why it is entirely appropriate to include EPA's 
farmworker protection rule in a study of nego tiated rulemaking. 
In Part III, I show how Harter is similarly mistaken in his criti-
cisms of my analysis of negotiated rulemaking and litigation. In 
Part IV, I respond to Harter 's claim that negotiated rulemaking 
has resulted in better rules, explaining why there is no more evi-
dence to support this claim than there is to support claims that 
negotiated rulemaking would save time and avoid litigation . 
The absence of support for Harter's criticisms, like the ab-
sence of empirical support for the many years ' worth of enthusi-
astic claims made for negotiated rulemaking, serves only to 
underscore the conclusion of my original research. The promises 
made for negotiated rulemaking remain unfulfilled. 
I 
Is N EGOTIATE D Ru LEMAKIN G A "CuRE ''? 
In his original 1982 article on negotiated rulemaking, Philip 
H arter advocated negotiated rulemaking as a cure for " [t]he mal-
aise of administrative law, which has marched steadily toward re-
liance on the judiciary to settle disputes and away from direct 
participation of affected parties ." 12 H e decried the time and ex-
pense of administrative rulemaking under conventional proce-
dures, observing that: 
12 Harter, Cure for .Malaise, supra note L at 113. 
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We have grown accustomed to rulem aking procedures th a t 
take severa l yea rs to comple te at the agency leve l and , in th e 
event judicial review is sought, anoth e r year or two in th e 
courts. 1l1e cost of pa rticipat in g in such a proceeding for both 
the agency and the private parties can be staggeringly high .13 
For Harter, negotiated rulemaking provided an alterna tive that 
would "reduce the time and cost of developing regulations." l-1 
He argued that it offered agencies an antidote to " the traditional 
battle'' of conventional rulemakin g. 15 
In negotiated rulemaking, a negotiation process takes place 
before an agency issues a proposed regulation.l 6 The agency 
!3 !d. at 2 l. See also id. at 6 (not ing that ·'the malaise rema ins-parti es co m -
pla in abo ut the tim e, ex pense . and legitimacy of the admini strative d ecisions 
reached by th e hybrid [notice-and -co mm e nt ru kmakin g] process") (footno tes 
omitted ). 
1.+ !d. at 30. 
15 !d . a t 112. 
IG The process is o utlined in the Negot ia ted Rul emaking A ct of 1990, 5 
U.S. C. s§ 561-570 ( 1994 & Supp. V 2000). vvhi ch wa s re -authorized by the Ad-
min ist rat ive Dispute R esolution Ac t o f 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 1 L 110 
Stat. 3870, 3873-74 (codified at 5 U .S. C. ~ 561 (S upp. III 1997)). Nego ti ated 
rulemak ing is sometim es re fe rred to as ''regul a to ry nego tiation ," o r " reg neg'' 
fo r short, but the term " regulatory ne got iation " actually connotes a broader 
range of processes of publi c participati on. H arter disputes this distinction, 
which I stipul a ted in Assessing Consensus. betwee n regulatory negotiatio n and 
negotiat ed rul emaking. Harte r. A ssessing rhe Assessors, supra note 5, at 33 n.L 
citing Coglianese, A ssessing Consensus, supra note 2, a t 1256 n .6. Harter sug-
gests th e two te rms are synony mo us, but in fac t th ey are not. "Negotiated 
ru lc makin g'' has a clearly de fined meanin g under federal law, 5 U.S.C. ~ 562, 
while th e term '' regulatory negotiation" does no t. In my many conversations 
with age ncy officials and represe ntatives fr om industry and environmental 
groups. I have fo und the te rm '·regulato ry negotiation·· used quite loose ly to 
refer to any number of forum s in which agency officials engage m e mbers of the 
pub lic. not all of which are techni cally "negot ia ted rulemakings." 1l1is usage 
may we ll stem in part from the fa ct tha t "negoti a ted rulcm a king" and '' reg ula-
tory negot iation " have long been tre ated as conceptually di stinct , contrary to 
Harter 's s uggestion . See, e.g . He nry H. Perri tt. Jr. , Negoriu ted Rulemaking 
Bej(He Federal Agencies: E va/uarion of Recommendations by rhe Adminisrrarive 
Conferen ce of rh e Uni1 ed Srmes. 74 GEo. L.J. 1625, 1630 n.1 3 (1986) ('"Regula-
tory negotiati o n ' refe rs to use o f negotiati on in any decisionrnaking process by 
an administrative agency. 'Negot ia ted rulem ak ing ' is a specific applicati on of 
regulato ry negotiation, the use of negoti at ion in the rul emaking process ."). In-
deed, in hi s 1982 article on negotiated rul em aking, Harter made a simil ar dis-
tinction between wha t he ca ll ed seq uenti a l "regulatory negot iation," consis ting 
o f individu a l meetings be twee n agency sta ff and interest group representatives, 
and the co llective, consensus-based negoti a tions that a re characteris tic of nego-
tiated rul emaking. H arter, Cure fo r i'vialaise. supra note 1, at 32-33. H a rte r 
again acknowledges, a lbe it tacitly , a di st inction between '· regul a to ry nego tia-
ti on·· and "negotiated rulemaking '· in his recent articl e criticizing my research. 
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convenes a committee comprised of representatives from regu-
lated firms, trade associations , citizen groups, and other affected 
organizations, as well as members of the agency staff. 17 The com-
mittee meets publicly to negotiate a proposed rule. If the com-
mittee reaches consensus, defined as a unanimous concurrence of 
all the interests , the agency uses the agreement as a basis for its 
proposed rule and then proceeds according to the notice-and-
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 1s 
H arter's 1982 article proved instrumental in garnering sup-
port for negotiated rulemaking as an alternative to conventional 
rulemaking. Tne article was based on a report to the A dministra-
tive Conference of the United States (ACUS). vvhich then 
formed the basis for ACUS 's recommendation that federal agen-
cies pursue negotiated rulemaking.19 The initial ACUS recom-
mendation noted that under the existing form of notice-and-
comment rulemaking, "[l]ong periods of delay result. and partici-
pation in rulemaking proceedings can become needlessly expen-
sive."20 ACUS's recommendation was premised on the 
expectation that negotiated rulemaking would overcome the de-
lays, litigation, and other adverse consequences associated with 
conventional rulemaking and would result in rules more accept-
able to the interests affected by agency decisions.21 
In the years following Harter's article and ACUS's recom-
mendation, agencies began to experiment with negotiated 
rulemaking and Congress began to consider legislation to pro-
vide clear authorization for its use.22 Legislative debate in Con-
gress, along with extensive commentary by academics and 
practitioners, emphasized that negotiated rulemaking would help 
There Harter notes that the Grand Canyon visibility rule promulgated in the 
early 1990s resulted from a "'negotiation" which. as he and I agre e. was not 
technically a ·'negotiated rulcmaking.'' Harter. Assessing rhe Assessors, supra 
note 5. at 50. The only way to claim that a regulation resulted from negotiations 
that were not part of a negotiated rulcmaking is to recognize , as I did in Assess-
ing Consensus. that "regulatory negotiation '' and "negotiated rulemaking'' are 
not fully synonymous. 
!7 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act. 5 U.S.C. 99 564-565 . 
ts For the Negotiated Rulcmaking Act's definition of consensus , sec 
~ 562(2). For the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures outlined in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S .C. § 553 (1994). 
lY ACUS, Procedures for Negotiating, supra note 4. at II. 
20 !d. 
21 !d. 
22 For a detailed review of the legislative debate anci commentary. sec Cog-
lianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1263-66. 
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reduce the delays and litigation that were thought to dominate 
the conventional rulemaking process. 23 In the years leading up 
to the passage of theN egotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,24 regu-
latory negotiation was consistently advocated as a means of im-
proving what was thought to be a time-consuming. litigation-
Drone regula tory process. 
l ...... "" ~ 
From 1983, when the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) initiated the first federal negotiated rulemaking,25 to 
1996. the year the Negotiated Rulemaking Act was permanently 
reauthorized,26 about a dozen federal agencies used the proce-
dure to develop and issue at leas t one rul e. All told, federal 
agencies had completed thirty-five rules using negotiated 
rulemaking, a number that amounted to less than 0.01% of all 
rules issued during the same period.27 As of 1996 , EPA had com-
pleted twelve negotiated rulemakings,28 more than any other 
agency. Interestingly, EPA has not initiated any new negotiated 
rulemaking since 1993. The Department of Transportation and 
n See id. at 1262-71 , 1343 app. D. 
24 See supro note 16. 
25 ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFER ENCE oF THE UNITED STi\TES, NEGOTIATED 
R u LEMAKt NG SouRCEBOOK 8 (David M . Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds. , 
1990) [hereinafter ACUS. 1990 SouRCEBOoK]. 
2n See supra note 16. 
27 See Cogli a nese . Assessing Consensus, supra note 2. a t 1276-77. 
2i' National E missions Standards for Coke Oven Batteries, 58 Fed. Reg. 
57.898 (Oct. 27, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63); Wood Furniture 
Manufacturing Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,930 (Dec. 7. 1995) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63); New Source Performance Standards for Residential 
Wood Heate rs , 53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (Feb. 26, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60): National Emiss ions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutan ts for Organic 
Che micals/Control o f Volatile Organic Chemical Equipment Leaks, 59 Fe el. 
R eg. 19,402 (Apr. 22, 1994) (to be cod ified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (Feb. 16, 1994) (to 
be coclifiecl at 40 C. F.R. pt. 80); Pe rmit Modifications for Hazardous Waste 
Manageme nt Facilities, 53 Feel. R eg. 37,912 (Sept. 28, 1988) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 124, 264, 265, & 270); Underground Inj ect io n of Hazardous Wastes, 
53 Fed. R eg. 28,11 8 (July 26, 1988) (to be codifi ed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124. 144, 
146. and 148); Disinfectant Byproducts in Drinking Water Information Collec-
tion Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (May 14, 1996) (to be cod ified a t 40 C.F.R. pt . 
141): Work er Protection for Agricultural Pesticides, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102 (Aug. 
21. 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156 & 170); Emergency Pesticide 
Exemptions, 51 Fed. R eg. 1896 (Jan . 15, 1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
166) : Asbestos-Containing Mate rials in Schools, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826 (Oct. 30, 
1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763); Nonconformance Penalties for 
H eavy-Duty Engines ancl Heavy-Duty Vehicles Under th e Clean Air Act, 50 
Feel . Reg. 35,374 (Aug. 30, 1985). 
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the Department of E ducation have also been among the most 
frequent users of negotiated rulemaking. 29 
Has the use of negotiated rulemaking "cured '' the malaise of 
administrative law? To evaluate whether negotiated rulemaking 
has had its intended impact , it is helpful to conceive of agencies' 
usc of negotiated rul emaking as an experiment. This is , after all. 
exactly how Harter and officials at ACUS described negotiated 
rulemaking when they first recommended its use. 30 Of course. 
like most procedural and policy innovations, negotiated rulemak-
ing has not been employed by agencies in a way that permits re-
searchers to evaluate its impact through pure experimental 
methods. 3 1 Agencies have not, for instance, selected rules for ne-
gotiation randomly from among all of an agency's rules. but in-
stead have tended deliberately to select rules for negot iation only 
after concluding that the rule stands a reasonable likelihood of 
successful negotiation.32 Although a true experimental method 
29 The Department of Transportation had promulgated seve n negotiated 
rul es : Flight Time Limitations and Rest R equirements, 50 Fed. R eg. 29,306 
(July 18. 1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts . 121 & 135): Nondiscr iminati on 
on the Bas is of H andicap in Air Trave l, 55 Feel. Reg. 8008 (M ar. 6, 1990) (to be 
cod ifi ed at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) : Uniform System for Handicapped Parking. 56 
Fed. R eg. !0,328 (Mar. 11 , 1991) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 1235) ; Draw-
bridge Operations. C hicago River, 60 Feel. Reg. 52,298 (Oct. 6, 1995) (to be 
cocl ifiecl at 33 C.F.R. pt. 117) ; Roadway Worker Protect ion, 61 Fed. R eg. 65.959 
(Dec. 16, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 214) ; Transportation for Indi vid -
uals with Disabilities , 56 Feel. Reg. 45,584 (Sept. 6, 1991) (to be codified at 49 
C.F. R. pts. 27. 37 & 38): Oil Spill Vessel Response Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 1052 
(pro posed Jan. 12, 1996) (to be codifi ed at 33 C.F.R. pt. 155). The D e partment 
of Education had promulgated six negotiated rules: Financial Assi stance to 
Meet Special Educa tional Needs of Children, 54 Feel. Reg. 21,752 (May 19. 
1989) (to be codifi ed at 34 C.F.R. pts. 75-78, 200 & 204); Helping Disadvan-
taged Ch ildren Meet High Standards, 60 Feel . Reg. 34,800 (Jul y 3, 1995) (to be 
cod ified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 203 , 205 & 212) ; State Vocational an d Ap-
plied Technology Ed ucation Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 36.720 (Aug. 14. 1992) (to 
be codified at 34 C. F.R. pts. 400-428); Guaranty Agency R eserve R egulations , 
59 Fed. Reg. 60 ,688 (Nov. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 682) : Direc t 
Student Loan R egul a tions , 59 Feel. Reg. 61,664 (Dec. 1, 1994) (to be codified at 
34 C.F.R. pt. 685); Higher Education Amendments of 1992, 59 Fed. R eg. 22.348 
(Apr. 29. 1994) ( to be codified at 34 C. F.R. pts. 668, 682, & 690). 
JO Harter, Cure fo r lv!alaise, supra note l, at 113; ACUS, Procedures for 
Negotiating. supra note 4, at 12. 
J I For a discussion of program evaluation research designs, see LwiRENCE 
B. MoH R, IMPACT A NALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EvALUATION (2cl eel . 1995) . 
32 The Negotiated Rule making Act requires that, in determining if there is a 
need to establish a nego tiated rul emaking, agencies conside r whether " there is 
a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a consensus .. , 5 U.S.C. 
§ 563(a)(4) (1994). T he criteria specifi ed in th e Act and by nego tiati o n consul-
tants for se lecting rules for negotiation favor th e selection of rules that are more 
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Neil Kerwin and Scott Furlong conducted a study of the duration 
of EPA rulemakings in which they briefly mentioned that they 
compared the duration of the four negotiat ed rules in their sam-
ple with the duration of the larger sample of 150 of the most 
significant EPA rules completed through the convention al 
rulemaking process.4 0 Us ing dates from EPA's internal regula-
to ry management system as the ir basis for operationalizing the 
duration of rulemaking, Kerwin and Furlong found tha t, on aver-
age, the four negotiated rules went through the entire rulema k-
ing process about eleven months faster than did the average 
conventional rule in their sample. 41 
A second effort to compare the outcomes of nego tiated and 
conventional rulemakings could be found in the Clinton Admin-
istration 's National Performance Review (NPR) report " Improv-
ing Regulatory Systems."42 The NPR report made brief but 
explicit claims comparing EPA's negotiated rules with its conven-
tional rules in terms of both time and the incidence of litiga ti on. -13 
In addition to citing the time savings reported by the Kerwin and 
F urlong study, the author of the NPR report stated that at EPA 
negotiated rulemakings had shortened the rulemaking process by 
up to eighteen months when compared with conventional 
rulemaking.-1-1 The report also asserted that negotiated rul emak-
ing reduced the litigat ion ra te for EPA rules from around sev-
enty-five to eighty percent to twenty percent for negotiated 
rules.-15 
rulemaki ng. Kerwin a nd Langbe in set o ut to co mpare the views of participants 
in negotia ted rul e m aking with the views of those who fil ed comments in con-
ve ntio na l ru lcmaking . but by 1996 they had o nly re porte d results fro m th e ir 
ne gotia ted r ule makin g inte rviews. Cornelius M. Ke rwin & Laura I. L angbein , 
An E va lua tion o f Negotiated Rulemaking at the E nviro nment a l Protectio n 
Agency: Phase I ( 1995) (un publ ished re port prepared for ACUS, on fil e with 
N.Y. U. Environmenrol La w Journ al) [h e re ina fte r Kerwin & Langbe in, Phase 1]. 
c~o See Corne iius M. Ke rvv in & Scot t R. Furlong, Time and Rulenwking A n 
Empirical Tesi of Theory , 2 J. Pus. ADM IN. REs . & TH EORY 113, 122, 124 
(1992). 
41 /d. a t 124, 134 ap p. A. However, Kerwin and Furlong r e port tha t th e 
m e dian length of n egotiated rul es was virtually the same as the median le ngth 
of the overa ll se t of rules examine e!. !d. at 134 app. A. 
-+2 OFFICE o r- TI-ll::: VICE PR ES IDENT, IMPRO VING REGULATOR Y SYSTErvr s : 
AccoMPt-\NYING R EPO RT OF THE NATIONA L PERFORMANCE R EV IEW 29 (Sept. 
1993). 
-+3 !d. at 31. 
44 Jd. at 32-33 n.S. 
-+5 !d. at 32 n.7. 
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In my research, I have also taken a comparative approach in 
evaluating the impact of negotiated rulemaking on the duration 
of rulemaking and the subsequent incidence of litigation. As I 
state in Assessing Consensus: 
My purpose ... is simply to assess negotiated rulemaking on 
its own terms , using the standards that have been set for it by 
those legislators, agency officials, practitioners, and scholars 
who have advocated its use over the years. The goals of saving 
time and reducing litigation are by far the most prominent 
ones invoked in the literature and the legislative bistory.46 
:rvry research follows appropriate standards for empirical research 
and overcomes major limitations of the two prior efforts to make 
comparative assessments of negotiated rulemaking. Unlike Ker-
win and Furlong (who, in fairness, never really set out to evalu-
ate negotiated rulemaking), I include in my assessment all the 
negotiated rulemakings completed by EPA during the study pe-
riod. Unlike the NPR report, I rely on primary source data on 
the filings of suits challenging EPA rules and thus provide an ac-
curate account of litigation filed against both negotiated and con-
ventional rules. By carefully applying empirical research 
methods, I find that on average it has taken EPA about three 
years to develop a rule, regardless of whether the agency used 
negotiated rulemaking or conventional rulemaking procedures.47 
The median duration is also about the same for negotiated and 
conventional rules. 48 Negotiated rulemaking does seem to make 
a difference when it comes to litigation-however, the difference 
is in the direction opposite to what has been expected. Negoti-
ated rules are challenged fifty percent of the time, while other 
comparable, significant EPA rules are challenged only thirty-five 
percent of the time.49 These results indicate all too clearly that 
negotiated rulemaking has failed to accomplish its goals of 
preventing litigation and saving time. Negotiation simply does 
not "cure" regulatory malaise. 
46 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus. supra note 2, at 1259-60 n.21. 
47 !d. at 1283-84. I compared the duration of all of EPA's negotiated 
rulemakings with the duration Kerwin and Furlong reported for the rules in-
cluded in their study, which were the most significant fifteen percent of all of 
EPA's rulemakings (150 rules) issued during their study period. See id. at 1280 
n.112. 1313-19. 
4S !d. at 1284 n.123. 
49 !d. at 1300-1301. 
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Harter disagrees with these findings. H e first criticizes how 1 
evaluate negotiated rulemaking's impact on the duration of th e 
regulatory process, arguing that I should exclude from my study 
one rule that EPA negotiated-the fa rmworker protection rule-
because its committee failed to reach a consensus. 50 In a few 
other cases, he also questions my reliance on the publication of 
the final rule to mark the compl etion of the rulemaking pro-
cess.5t In total, Harter criticizes my data with respect to the four 
E PA negotiated rulemakings that took the agency the longest to 
complete. As a resu lt, Harter claims th at once his modifications 
to the data are made. the average duration of negotiated 
rulem akings is shorter than the durat ion of conventional 
rulemakings.52 He is correct that the average dura tion would de-
cline if the longest negotiated rules were to be excluded or their 
length were to be truncated. H e is wrong, however , to sugges t 
that such modifications should be made. The farmworker protec-
tion rule, while a failure in terms of achieving consensus , still rep-
resented an earnest effort by the EPA to negotiate the rule and 
merits inclusion in any evaluation of nego tiated rulemaking.53 
The other modifications Harter urges fail to adhere to the basic 
precepts of consistency and reliability in empirical analysis.54 
rvioreover, even if one were to be persuaded by H arter 's advo-
cacy, his modifications would only affect the average duration of 
negotiated rulemaking, and not the more appropriate measures 
of rulemaking time.55 The median duration of negotiated 
rulemaking remains largely unchanged even after Harter 's modi-
ficationsY' ~.!Jore significantly, whatever one makes of the dura-
tion of rules from start to finish , the overall investment of staff 
time and effort by agencies and outside organizations remains 
indisputably and significantly greater for negotiated rulemaking. 
:'ill Harter, Assessiug the Assessors, supm note 5, at 41-42. 
s1 !d. at 45-49. 
:'2 Id. a t 49. 
:'3 See inf/'a Part I I. A. 
5-I See infra Part II. B. 
55 See infra text accompanyin g not es 126-29 and Part II. C. 
-i (, See infi'a tbl.l. 
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A. EPA's Negotimecl Rulemaking on Fannworker Protection 
Harter first see ks to exclude from analysis what he calls the 
"peculiar case" of the farmworker protection rulemaking. 57 In 
1985, EPA initiated a negotiated rulemaking process to establish 
a regulation that would reduce the exposure of agricultural work-
ers to the spray of pesticides. 58 1l1e agency convened a negotia-
tion committee comprising represe nt atives frorn farming 
organizations , farmworker unions, agricultural and forest prod-
ucts trade associations , state and local governments, the U .S. De-
partment of Agriculture , and the EPA. 59 1l1e committee met as a 
plenary group on several occasions, established a series of five 
vvorking groups, and developed and circul ated working drafts of 
a proposed regulation .60 As the committee neared completion of 
a fina l draft of the proposed rule , th e nego tiations reached an 
impasse,61 and the representati ves from the farmworker organi-
za tions decided to end their involvement with the negotiations. 62 
The EPA attempted to bring the farmworkers' representatives 
back into the discussions and continued to mee t with the remain-
ing members of the committee.63 In the end, however, the 
agency \vas unable to secure a meaningful consensus vvithout the 
involvement of the farmwork ers ' representatives, whom the 
age ncy failed to bring back to the table officially. 
Harter claims the farmworker protection rule should be ex-
cluded from my analysis of the effectiveness of negot iated 
ru l emaki ng. 6~ He asserts that the farmworker protection negoti-
ated rulemaking was "abandoned'' by EPA and that the bulk of 
the time associated with this regulation should not be attributed 
to negotiated rulemaking because it took place after the negotia-
57 Harter, Assessing the Assessors. supra not e 5, a t 41. 
:>s See Intent to Form an Adviso ry Committee to Negot iate Pro posed 
Farmworke r Pro tection Standards for Agricultura l Pesticides , 50 Fed. R eg. 
38.030 (Sept. 19. 1985) . 
59 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultura l Pes ticides, 53 Feci. R eg. 
25.970. 25.972 (proposed July 8, 1988) (to be codified a t 40 C.F.R. pts. 156 & 
L 70). 
60 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pes ticides, 53 Fed. R eg. 
at 25,972-25,973. 
61 See SussKI ND & FIELD. supra note 8, at 35. 
62 See Worker Protec ti o n Standards for A gricultural Pes ticides , 53 Fed. R eg. 
a t 25 ,973. 
6~ See. e.g. , Work e r Pro tection Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25.973: Susskind & 
V<ln Dam , supra note I , at 44. See also Suss KI ND & FIELD , supra note 8, at 35. 
64 Harter. Assessing the Assessors, supm note 5, at 42. 
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tions collapsed. 65 Yet what happened in the farmworker protec-
tion rulemaking could happen in any negotiated rulemaking. 
Negotiation does not always yield a consensus , and the mere fact 
that consensus is not reached is no reason to exclude from evalu-
ation those rules for which the agency otherwise earnestly tried 
to use negotiation. 
If we are to determine whether negotiated rulemaking is ef-
fective in achieving its goals, both common sense and conven-
tional empirical research methods dictate that we look at all the 
cases vvh ere the technique was used , not only those cases where it 
succeeds. Although negotiated rui emakings should be excluded 
when they were genuinely abandoned, 1 specifically state in As-
sessing Consensus that by "abandoned" negotiated rulemakings 
" I do not mean that the participants fail ed to reach consensus. "6 6 
Rather , in a passage that Harter quotes,67 I treat as " abandoned" 
those rulemakings for which the agency, at some point after pub-
lication of an intent to negotiate, either (1) "decided not to com-
mence negotiations," (2) "disbanded the committee before 
seeking even a limited agreement,'' or (3) "withdrew the underly-
ing regulatory action altogether." 6~ Rulemakings that meet any 
one of these three criteria are rulemakings for which the agency 
failed to use the negotiation process earnestly as a means of de-
veloping a rule, or for which the agency declared its decision to 
issue no rule at all.6 9 They are cases where the agency essentially 
decided to forego altogether the experimental treatment called 
negotiated rulemaking. 
The EPA did commence and earnestly pursue negotiations 
in the farmworker protection rule. The agency worked diligently 
and responsibly to seek an agreement in this case , and apparently 
even came close to doing so.7° When problems arose , the agency 
li5 ld. 
66 Coglianese. Assessing Consensus. supra note 2, at 1277 n.98. 
67 H arter quotes my fu ll definition of "abandoned" negotiated rul emakings. 
Harte r, A ssessing the A ssessors , supra no te .5 , at 39 n.30. 
68 Coglianese , A ssessing Consensus , supra note 2, at 1274 n.98, 1274 tbl.l. 
li9 As I have noted before, the fact that age ncies have decided to abandon 
certain rules without earnestly see king agreement shows that rules are not se-
lected for negotiation randomly. In fact. the selection crite ria used by agencies 
to choose rules for negotiation- and th en to pursue those negotiations ear-
nestly- favor precisely those rules that are more likely to succeed in th e first 
place. See id. at 1312. 
70 Susskind and Field write that the farmwork ers withdrew from the com-
mittee " [a] s the final draft approached comple ti on." Suss KI ND & FIELD, supra 
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and the other parties offered to replace the facilitator in an effort 
to keep the farmworkers' representatives on the committee. 71 
TI1e EPA continued to hold meetings with the rest of the commit-
tee, "hoping that the farmworkers' representatives would re-
turn. "72 In addition, the EPA reportedly continued to share 
drafts of the proposed rule with the farmworkers' representatives 
before the opening of the notice-and-comment period. 73 EPA 
did not "abandon'' the farmworker protection negotiated 
rulemaking; rather, one non-governmental interest abandoned 
the negotiation committee-the committee simply failed to reach 
a consensus.74 
EPA did eventually issue a final farmworker protection rule, 
and in doing so the agency made a point of crediting the negotia-
tion process for having "helped shape the proposed regula-
tion. "75 Harter himself suggests that the agency learned much 
from the negotiation process and that the discussion draft that 
emerged from the negotiations formed a basis for its final rule. 76 
In making this suggestion, however, Harter essentially concedes 
that the farmworker protection rule was, after all, a negotiated 
rulemaking. One cannot consistently treat the rule as a negoti-
ated rulemaking in order to claim credit for some benefits, only 
note 8, at 35. For further discussion of the extensive negotiations that took 
place. see Worker Protection Stanclarcls for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Feel. 
Reg. 25,970, 25.973 (proposed July 8, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156 
& 170). 
71 Susskind & Van Dam, supra note L at 44. Harter was the facilitator of 
this negotiated rulemaking. See 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 388. 
72 Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 1, at 44. 
73 !d. 
7-+ In a Federal Register notice published the following year, EPA described 
the farmworker protection rulemaking as one of the agency's "successfully con-
ducted'" negotiations. Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate 
Regulations Governing Major and Minor Modifications of Resource, 51 Feel. 
Reg. 25,739, 25,740 (July 16. 1986). As stated in this same notice, "EPA en-
couraged the [farmworker] group to return, and kept all Committee members 
fullv informed to all developments. The remainder of the committee continued 
to r;1eeL with some in the absent interest group participating informally. The 
draft rule produced, while not a consensus package. attempts to balance the 
concerns of all parties." Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate 
Regulations Governing Major and Minor Modifications of Resource , 51 Feel. 
Reg. at 25,740. 
75 Worker Protection Stanclarcls, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,973. 
76 Harter, Assessing the Assessors. supra note 5, at 42 n.47 (citing EPA Pesti-
cide Division staff members as claiming that "the agency learned a huge 
amount'' from the negotiations and "based significant administrative action on 
that insight"). 
402 N. Y.U. LNV!RON!'v!ENTAL LAW JOURNAL 
to exclude it when it comes to assessing whether negotiated 
rul emaking achieves other benefits . 
Significan tl y, no one ever claimed that the farmworker pro-
tection rule should be treated as anything but a completed nego-
tiated rulemaking until after my research results were published. 
Lee Thomas. who served as the EPA Administrator during the 
negotia tions and through the publication of the proposed rule , 
counted th e farmworker protection rule among EPA's negotiated 
rules .77 'vVhen the EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Evalua-
tion set out to assess how well negotiated rulemakin g worked, it 
included the farmworker protection rule in its study . 7~ Indeed, 
on eight separate occasions, the EPA listed the farmworker pro-
tection rule as an example of one of its negotiated rulemaking in 
the Federal Register.7° The rule has appeared in three separate 
77 Lee M. Thomas. The Successfit! Use of R egulmory Nego£iarion hy EPA. 
Ao rvt tl" . L. Nr:ws, Fall 1987. at l, 3. In a speech given in 1986. T homas re fe rred 
to th e farmworker protection rule as one of EPA's "complet ec.l" negotiated 
rulem akings , not as a rulcmaking the agency had abandoned: 
R ece ntly. we comple ted our third negotiated rulemaking. This one. 
dealing with farmworker protection, proved som eth ing we knew all a long. 
Negotiations are not easy, and they will not always proceed without 
trouble .. .. 
Whil e the farmworkcr protect ion standards negotiation start ed out 
with promise , one of th e major part icipa nts elected to leave the advisory 
committee before a final package was agreed upon . Thi s is permissible 
unde r terms of the negotiation process. While it created a problem for 
those remaining in the rulemaking exercise, the interest group continued 
to participate informally. The committee kept th e group fully informed of 
a ll deve lopments, and provided drafts of the regulatory package as it 
emerged .... 
Lee M. Th o mas , Remarks at the Third National Co nference on Dispute Reso-
lution 9 (May 29. 1986) (transcr ipt on fil e with author). 
78 See PROC RMvi Ev;-\ LU ;\T ION D1v., E PA. AN AssESSM E"'T OF EPA 's NE-
GOTI ;-\TLD Ruu::tv! I\KING A CTIVITI ES (1987) , reprillled in ACUS. 1995 
So uRCE GOOK , supra note 4, at 23 , 25. 
7Y lntent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Proposed R eg ula-
ti on for Architectural and In d ustrial Maintenance Coati ngs Under Section 
1873(e) of Clean Air Act as Amended and Announcemen t of Public Meeting. 
57 Fed . Reg. 3 1.473 (July 16, 1992); In tent to Form an Advisory Committee to 
Negotiate Guidelines and Proposed Regulations Impl ementing Clean Fuels 
Provi sions and Announcement of Public Meeting, 56 Fed. R eg. 5167 (Feb. 8 , 
1991 ): Underground Inj ec tion ControL Class II Wells: intent to Form an Advi-
sory Committee to Negotiate Amendments to Regulations, 56 Feel. R eg. 4957 
(Feb. 7. 1991): NOx Emission Reduction Provisions and Announce ment of Pub-
lic Meeting. 56 Feel. Reg. 21 ,348 (May 8, 1991); Intent to Form an Advisory 
Committee to Negotiate Recycling of Lead Acid Batteries & Anno uncement of 
Organizationa l Meeting, 55 Feel. R eg. 52,884 (Dec. 24, 1990): Candidates for 
Regulatory Negotiation, 53 Feel. Reg. 51.003 (Dec. 19, 1988): Consideration of 
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reports issued by ACUS. aga in li sted as one of E PA's negoti a ted 
rulem akings.8u EPA's Consensus and D ispute Resolution Pro-
gram has kept its own internal list of EPA negotiated rul emak-
ings, on which the farmworker pro tec tion rule can be foun d:3 1 
Finall y, the director of the Conse nsus and D ispute R esolution 
Program. C hr is Kirtz, published an article lis ting the farmwo rk er 
protection rul e as one of EPA 's negoti ated rul emakings . ~' 2 
Interes tingly , EPA's in te rn al li st of negotiated rulem akings 
was recentl y modifie d to add a sentence to the description of the 
farmwork er protection rul emaking stating that the "negotia ti on 
was abandoned. ''03 T his sta tement neve r appeared in three ear-
lier ve rsions of thi s E PA lis t of negotiated rulemakings,84 making 
it reasona ble to wonder vvhy E PA staff wo uld change its descrip-
tion in this document more than five years after EPA issued its 
final rule and more than ten years after the fa rmworkers recon-
sidered their invo lvement in the nego ti a tions. Perhaps part o f 
Estab li shing an Adviso ry Comm ittee to Negotiate Proposed Regul ati ons Im -
plementing the Asbestos Hazard Em ergency Respo nse Act of 1986. 52 Fed. 
R eg. 1377 (Jan . 13 . 1987); In te nt to Fo rm an A dv isory Committee to Nego ti ate 
R egulat ions Gove rnin g Major an d Minor Modifi ca tions of Reso urce. 51 Fe el. 
Reg. 25 .739 (Jul y 16. 1986). 
t;o ACU S, !990 Sou RCEBOOK. supra no te 25. 331-32; ACUS. 1995 
Sou RCE BOOK. supra note 4. at 388; ADM INI STRATIVE CoNFER ENCE o r: THE 
UN ITED STAI' ES. Bu iLD ING CoNSENSUS IN AGENCY RuLEMAKING : LviPL EMENT-
ING Ti lE NEGOTL\TJ::: D Ru LE MAK ING AcT 56 (1995) [hereinafte r ACU S. BUILD-
ING CONS ENSUS]. 
81 EPA, N Ec>OTJ,\TED R uLEMAK ING AT THE El'!V IRONMENT;\L PROTECTION 
AGENCY 4 (Mar. 1992) (on fil e with the author); EPA NEGOTIATED R u u ::M ;\K 
lNG ."'.T THE ENV IRONMENTAL PROTECTION AG ENCY 5 (Oct. 1992) (on fi k with 
the author): EPA . NEGOTIATED R u LE'VI;\K ING AT TilE EN VIRONMENTAL PRo-
TECTION AG ENCY 6 (Nov. 18. 1994) (o n fil e wi th the author). There is one 
negot iated ru lemaking- on lead acid battery recycling- th at was inclucl ecl on 
these lists but vv hich I treated as "ab and o ned. " That is because it truly was . 
The EPA decided. based on its risk and cos t an alysis. not to issue any rul e at a ll 
on lead acid ba ttery recycling. See id. a t 4-5 (noting that E PA adj ourned the 
committ ee '" after reviewing the risk and cost info rmation [and concluding] that 
the r isk/benefi ts did not adequately balance th e cost of regulating"); Lead-Acid 
Bauery Conuniuee Disbanded by EPA After Months of R egulatory Talks. 22 
Env't R ep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1339 (Sep t. 20, 199!) (noting that EPA te rminated 
the entire ru le making aft er "two reports showed that th e costs associated wi th 
increas ing lead acid bat te ry recycling we re not just ified by the small redu ction 
in risk " ). 
82 Chris Kirtz. Regulatory Negotimion: Th e Ne w Way ro D evelop R egula-
tiom'? l J. ENVTL. PERiviiTTING 269, 277 (1992) . 
83 E PA, NEGOT IATED RuLE fviAK INCi AT TH E ENV IRONMENTAL P ROTECTI ON 
AG ENCY 6 (Jan. 2. 1998) (emphasis adcl ccl) (on fi le with the auth or) . 
s-1 See supra no te 81. 
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the explanation li es in the fact that EPA made a point to dis-
tribute copies of its altered list at the 1998 Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools panel organized around my researcl?-.85 When 
the farmworker protection proceeding was described earlier by 
the agency in the Federal R egister , EPA never described the ne-
gotiated rule making as having been "abandoned" (the same 
word used to label the category of rules excluded from my 
study). Rather, EPA noted that representatives from four groups 
"decided to discontinue participation in the Regulatory Negotia-
tion process" and that afterwards the agency still scheduled four 
additional meetings with the remaining members of the negotia-
tion committee.06 
Notwithstanding Harter 's and EPA's efforts to revise the 
historical record , the farmworker protection rule is properly con-
sidered one of the agency's negotiated rules. Administrative lmv 
scholars have considered it as such. 87 Moreover, Laura Langbein 
and Neil Kerwin, whose research Harter considers "rigorous" 
and "the only careful and comprehensive" empirical research on 
negotiated rulemaking/:;8 initially included the farmworker pro-
tection rule in their study. 8 l) They eventually dropped it from 
their sample of negotiated rules, but not because of any princi-
ss Chaired by Pete r Schuck of Yak Law School , th e panel included Philip 
Harter, Jody Freeman of UCLA. Thomas Kelly , of E PA 's R egul a tory Manage-
ment and Informat ion Office , and myse lf. Kelly has also subsequen tly criticize d 
my research in terms similar to Harter's. For an exchange with Kelly, see 
11-wmas E. Kelly , Le tters, Questionable Conclusions, Gov'T ExEcUTIVE, Oct. 
L998, available at 1998 WL 10315070: Cary Coglianese, Letters, More on Nego-
tiated Rulemaking, Gov'T ExEcuT rv c, Mar. 1999, a t 88, available ar 1999 WL 
11998419. 
86 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Fed. R eg. 
25,970, 25 .973 (proposed July 8. L988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156 & 
170). See also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. Under the operating 
protocol for this negotiated rulemaking, the committee members were permit-
ted to discontinu e negotiations at any time. See Philip J. Harter. The Role of 
Courts in R egulatory Negoriarion- A Response to Judge Wale/, 11 CoLUM . J. 
E NVTL. L. 51 , 72 (1986) (reprinting th e ope rating protocol for the farmwork e r 
protection negotiated rulemaking). 
87 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival , Th e Bounds of Consent: Consent D ecrees, 
Settlements and Federal Environm enral Policy Making, 1987 U. CH I. LEG AL. F. , 
327, 330 n.10: Perritt , supra note !6, a t 1686-87; Sidney A. Shapiro, L essons 
ji"om a Pubiic Policy Failure: EPA and Noise Abatement , 19 EcoLOGY L.Q. J, 
56 (1992). 
ss Har ter , Assessing rh e A ssessors, supra note 5, at 55-56. 
89 Langbein & Kerwin, R egulatory N egotiation versus Conventional Rule 
Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Ernpirical E vidence , 10 J. Pus. ADMI N. 
RES. & THEORY 599, 600 (2000). 
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pled or methodological reason for excluding it from a study of 
the performance of negotiated rulemaking. Rather, Langbein 
and Kerwin dropped it simply because they were unable to locate 
enough of the participants in the rulemaking to interviewY° Fur-
thermore, Harter has himself acknowledged that the farmworker 
protection rulemaking was a negotiated rulemaking, going so far 
as to reprint the organizational protocol for the negotiations as 
an appendix to an earlier article . 91 
It is understandable why an advocate would now like to 
treat the farmworker protection rulemaking as if it were not a 
negotiated rulemaking for the purpose of determining the aver-
age duration of negotiated rules. The farmworker protection 
rule took longer to complete than any other. 92 A s Harter points 
out, removing this one rule from the group of FPA negotiated 
rulemakings has the effect of decreasing the average duration of 
these rules by approximately four monthsY-' Yet Harter fails to 
note that in using Federal Register notices to compute the dura-
tion of negotiated rulemakings, I actually understate the average 
duration by about the same amount of time. As I note in Assess-
ing Consensus, "Federal Register listings yield an average time 
for the four negotiated rules in the Kerwin and Furlong study of 
1.8 years ( 647 days), more than four months shorter than the av-
erage they report for the same rules [778 days]. "94 Iviy approach 
therefore underestimates rulemaking duration because it ex-
cluded the agency work that precedes the publication of a notice 
of intent and which leads the agency to make the decision to en-
LJO See id. (stating that "[w]e had to drop one negotiated rule because we 
could not locate enough respondents (Farmworkcr Protection Standards)"): 
Kerwin & Langbein, Phase I, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that "the location 
efforts were so unsuccessful that the reg neg-farrnworker protection-was 
dropped from the original list of nine . reducing it to the current eight"). 
91 Harter, supra note 86, at 60, 70-72 app. 
92 In his critique, Harter states that "if one wants to make much of 'average ' 
time for development, the aberrant nature of [the farmworker protection] case 
should be noted.'' Harter, Assessing the Assessors. supra note 5, at 42. If by 
this Harter means to suggest that I do not reveal the duration of this rule, he is 
again mistaken. I distinctly note in Assessing Consensus that the farmworker 
protection rule was the negotiated rulemaking of longest duration. Coglianese, 
Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1279. 
93 Harter, Assessing rhe Assessors, supra note 5, at 42. Harter does not incli-
cate that even by excluding this rule the median duration of EPA's negotiated 
rules decreases by only less than a month: from 777 days to 749 days. For a 
discussion of the median as a measure of central tendency, see infra text accom-
panying note 129. 
94 Coglianese , Assessing Consensus. supra note 2. at 1282-83. 
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gage in a negotiated rul emaking. In this and other ways, my ap-
proach re li es on conservative measures that in effect create a 
"deliberate bias in favor of finding a time savings in rules devel-
oped with negotia ted rulemaking procedures. "95 A s a result, 
even supposing the farmworker protec tion rule should be ex-
cluded CIS a negotiated rulemaking, the resulting average time de-
crease caused by excluding it is still within the bounds of what 
can be explained by the conse rvative measure I used for the du-
ration of negotiated rulemaking Y6 It is simply not possible to 
conclude with any confidence that nego tiated rulemaking has 
made th e rulemaking process significantly short er. 
B . Calculating RuLemaking Duration 
Harter critiques my analysis of rulemaking duration in other 
ways . He claims, fo r example , that by using a " strictly numerical 
methodology" for evaluating the duration of rulemaking I have 
ignored " the varying complexity o f rules. ''97 He notes that 
"'[r]ulemaking is an inherently poli tical activity'' and argues that 
·'counting days between two events disregards all the dynamics of 
pohtical activity." 98 Although Harter never clearly states what 
inference he thinks should be drawn from these vague points, he 
appears to be suggesting either (1) that negotiated rulemaking 
should not be subject to empirical eva luation99 or (2) that omit-
ted , perhaps even unmeasurable , variables influence the duration 
of the rulemaking process, making quan tit ative ana lysis unreha-
ble. T11ere is no reason to support the first claim that negotiated 
rulemaking should be exempt from the kind of evaluation to 
'J:i !d. at 1283-84 n.l20 (emphas is added) . 
% Nloreover, if the fa rmworker protection ru le were removed from the set 
of negoti ated rules , this would only serve to increase the overall litigat ion rate 
for nego tiated rulem akings to fif ty-live percent, since the far mworker protec-
ti on rule was never subj ected to a peti ti on for judici a l review. Of course, E PA 
did nego tiate the farmwork er protec tion rule, as the <tge ncy earnes tly sought to 
obtain an agreement. 
'J7 Harter, Assessing the Assessors , supm no te .5 . at 4.5. 
l) ,') Jd. 
99 Cf, Harter , Fear of Commirrnenr. supm no te 5, a t 1421 (noting his ·'skepti -
cism over eval ua tions"). Inte restingly. Harter' s purported skepticism of evalua-
ti ons is se lec tive. H e draws no issue with the me thodology of the Kerwin and 
Furlong study , supra note 40, which also counted days, no r with that of th e 
Langbein and Kerwin study, supra note 89, whi ch also e mpl oyed a " num erical 
method ology '· but whi ch H arter conside rs .. e no rmously he lpfuL'' Harte r , Fear 
of Comnzirmenr, supra note .5, at 1421. 
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which oth er po licies or procedures are normall y subjcctecl.tuu 
E ven ad vocates of negoti ated rulemCJ.king recognize that it 
should be subject to evalu a tion. 10 1 
~n1 e second claim raises a concern that sho uld be considered 
fo r all empirical research, but it matters only if th e re is reason to 
suspect th at omitted variables are relevant and sys tematically bi-
asing the results in one direction. 10 2 Harte r offe rs no credible 
reason to suspect th a t th e so-called .. dyn amics" inherent to all 
rul emaking systematica ll y opera te to lengthen th e time it would 
othe rwi se take to compl e te the rulemakings tha t were negoti-
ated. no r does he specify any particular variable that should have 
been included in my analysis. In contrast. I ex te nsive ly scrutinize 
the poss ibility of omitted variable bias in Assessing Consensus. 10-1 
A ll th e available evidence indicates that the rul es se lected for 
nego ti atio n tend to involve underlying issues and interes ts that 
made th e m more- not less-likely to succeed in achieving a 
timely outcome. 104 E PA has no t used negotiated rul e rnaking for 
llltl See supra note 10 and acco mpanying text. See also A CUS . Procedures for 
Nego ti a tin g, supra note 4. at 11 (no ting that negotiated rul emaking "should be 
reviewed a ft e r it has been used a reasonable number of tim es"). 
111 1 See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon. Th e Theo ry and Pmcrice o( 
Negoriared Rulenwking . 3 Y ALE J. ON REG. 133. !42 ( 1985) (no ting tha t th~ 
be ne fit s o f negotiated rul emaking must be dem o nstra ted). See generally Ker-
win . supra no te 11. 
1u2 See. e.g. , King e t al.. supra no te 33, a t 169 (no ting th a t "we ca n safel y omit 
co ntro l var iabl es . eve n if they have a s trong influence o n the depe nd e nt varia-
ble. as lo ng as they do no t va ry with th e included explana tory variable " ). 
lll3 Coglianese , Assessing Consensus, supra not e 2. a t 13 13- 17. King. Keo-
han e . and Verba '·advise th a t a ll researche rs, quantit a tive and qualitative. sys-
te ma tica lly look for omitted co ntro l variables and consid er whe the r they should 
be includ ed in the analysis." Kir..J G ET A L.. supra note 33 , a t 172. For precise ly 
thi s reaso n. I specifically examin ed th e possibility th a t the eco nomic impact o f 
th e rule (th a t is, those ru les class ifi ed as major rul es under Executi ve Orde rs 
12291 a nd 12866 ) would affect the a nalysis, since so-ca ll ed ma jo r rules d o te nd 
to take a io nger tim e to deve lo p and are more prone to liti ga ti o n. I concluded 
that this vari a ble does no t accoun t fo r my findin gs sin ce "EPA bas no t nego ti-
a ted a disproportionate num ber o f m a jor rules. " Cogli anese, Assessing Conserz-
sus . sup ru no te 2. at 13 13 n.259 . L3 L6. Furthermo re. a ltho ugh th e number o f 
cases is smalL EPA's maj or nego tia ted rules took longer to develop than did 
othe r EPA major rules and we re still challenged at a highe r ra te than were its 
ma jo r r ules overall. !d. 
104 Ha rte r asserts that th e rules selected for nego ti a ted rul ema king have in -
vo lved ·' particularly d ifficult. co n te ntious issues th a t have e luded closure by 
mea ns o f trad itional ruiemakin g procedures.' ' Harte r, Assessing th e A ssesso rs . 
sup ra no te 5. a t 38-39. In contras t. EPA itself has acknowledged th a t negotiated 
ru le mak in g has been se lected fo r ·'second-tier " rul es whi ch address " program 
imple me nta ti on-rathe r th an rul es establishing program st ructure .·· Program 
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the rules affecting the broadest number of organ izations nor for 
those rules raising the most contentious policy issues . Rather, 
the agency has tended to follow the advice of negotiation consul-
tants, as well as the guidelines of the Negotia ted Rulemaking 
Act, to select rules for negotiation for which the agency deter-
mines there is a preexisting likelihood of success within a limited 
amo un t of time.105 Admittedly, on some occasions the agency 
has selected significant rulemakings to negotiate and, as vve 
know, it has al so sometimes misjudged whether a consensus 
could be attained in a fixed time peri od. 10() Overall, though, the 
agency has tended to select rules that are expected to take less 
time to promulgate .l07 
Harter also claims that instead of using a consistent , verifia-
ble method of calculating rulemaking duration , I should have im-
puted differen t ending points to negotiated rules based on "the 
actual, immediate goal the agency hoped to accomplish" and 
"what those who would be affected by the agency's action 
thought." 108 Harter asserts that because I used the date when 
the agency published its final rule, rather than imputing ending 
Evaluati on D ivision , supra note 78, at 23, 34. EPA's sta tement of selectio n cri -
teria for negotiated rul emaking begins by notin g that " [i]t is important to screen 
potential rul emakings to identify instances wh ere negotia ti on of th e rul e has a 
high probability of successful use. " EPA R EGULATORY NEGOT IATION CANDI-
DATE SeLECTIO N CR ITERIA, reprinted in ACUS. 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 
4, at 42. 42. See also EPA R egula tory Negotiation Project 48 Feel . R eg. 7494, 
7495 (Feb . 22, 1983) (n oting tha t '' it is important to screen pote nti a l rulemak-
ings to identify where this approach has a hi gh probability of s uccess"). In As-
sessing Consensus, I extensively consiclerecl the possibility that th e rules E PA 
se lected for negotiation were more difficult o r co nt e ntious a t the outset. Cog-
li anese, Assessing Consensus , supra no te 2, a t 1311 -21. My review indicated 
tha t whil e E PA 's negotiated rules were ge ne ra lly not trivia l o nes, neither were 
they the m ost signi fican t or contlict-riclclen rul es promulgated by the agency. 
!d . at 1318-19. 
105 For examples of selectio n guid e lines, see Cogli anese, Assessing Consen -
sus, supm note 2, a t 131 9-20. 
lOti See supra Part II.A. 
107 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, a t 1317-21. See also 
Steven J. Ball a & John R. Wright, Consensual Ru!em aking and the Time It 
Ta k es to D evelop Rules 25 (1 999) (unpublished paper presented a t the Fifth 
Nati onal Pu blic Management Confe rence, College Station, TX, D ec. 3-4, 1999, 
o n fil e with au thor) (finding th at negotiated rulemaking was used for rules that 
were rel a tively easier to resolve); Jeffrey P. Cohn, Clearing rhe A ir , G ov'T Ex-
ECUT IVE, Sept. 1, 1997, at 45, 50, available at 1997 WL 9254804 (stating that 
"most negotiated rule-making involves relatively narrow rules" and usually 
does not work for "[h]i ghly politici zed issues, ones with broad national implica-
tions or o nes th a t represent new policy directions' '). 
Iu~ Harter, Assessing the Assessors , supra note 5. at 45. 
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points for negot iated rulemakings, I fail "[t]o conduct an accu-
rate empirical study of rulemaking." 109 Actually, the danger is 
just the opposite . If researchers studying the duration of 
rulemaking were to make their own ad hoc decisions about when 
a rulemaking begins and ends, their research would lack re liabil-
ity.110 Without clear criteria for collecting data and making mea-
surements, individual researchers would have to make their own 
decisions about when an agency 's rulemakings ended. Such an 
approach would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to verify and interpret results across studies. 111 
Tims, it is important for researchers to operationalize 
rulemaking duration using a consistent, verifiable indicator such 
as Federal Register notices or other uniform administrative in-
dicators. This is a lmost certainly the reason that Neii Kerwin and 
Scott Furlong opted for such an approach, re lying on the elates 
found in EPA's internal regulatory tracking system rather than 
their own interpretation of when individual rulernakings were 
completed. 112 More recently, political scientists John Wright and 
Steven Balla conducted a further study of the length of negoti-
ated rulemaking- again using the dates of notices in the Federal 
Register. 11 3 Choosing the date on which a final rule is promul-
109 !d. at 46. In suggesting that researchers should use the "actual, imm ed iate 
goa l the agency hoped to acco mplish ," Harter appears to conceive of admi nis-
trative age ncies as unified enti ties that typically possess a single, disce rnible 
goal in a rule making. !d. Yet bureaucratic organizations are much more com-
plex . with different actors in an agency possessing differen t goals. See JAMES Q. 
V>/ILSON, BuREAUCRACY: WHAT G ovERNMENT AGENCIES D o AN D WHY THEY 
Do IT 27-28 (1989); R. SH EP MELNI CK, REG ULATION AND THE CouRTs: THE 
C "\SE oF THE CLEAN AIR A cT 38-43 (1983). Moreover , if Harter were correct 
that in some cases the agency achieved its actual goal prior to the promulgation 
of the final rule. then o ne might well have expected the agency to have promul-
ga ted the final ruk at that earlier tim e, or at leas t as soon after the close of the 
comment period as possible. That the agency did not do so, and in some cases 
worked for seve ral more years before issuing a final rule , raises the likel ihood 
th at there we re other, more nuanced or complicated goals at stake in these 
cases . 
110 See, e.g. , KI NG ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 (stressing th e importance of 
ensuring "that data-collection methods are re li able" so that " applying the same 
procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure"). 
Il l See. e.g., id. at 26-27 (stressing the importance of replicability and urging 
that "scholars should always record the exact methods, rules, and procedures 
used to gather information and draw inferences so tha t another researcher can 
do the same thing and draw (one hopes) th e same conclusion''). 
11 2 Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 40, at 121-22. 
11 3 Balla & Wright supra note 107, at 14 (using th e time that elapsed be-
twee n th e publication of the proposed rule and the issuance of the final rule). 
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gated is particularly appropriate given that this is the point at 
which the agency has taken a final, legally reviewable action.1 14 
Since one of the main goals attributed to negotiated ruler:naking 
is to reduce subsequent litigation over agency rules, it is entirely 
appropriate to use the publication of the fi nal rule as the ending 
point of a negotiated rulemaking for purposes of evaluation . 
Even Langbein and Kerwin , in the study that Harter praises, re-
gard the outcome of the negoti ated rulemaking as the promulga-
tion of the final rule.1 ts 
Moreover, as any administrative lawyer knows , the rulemak-
ing process does not necessarily end once the agency issues a fi -
nal rule. Even putting aside any subsequent litigation, agencies 
do revisit their final rules, amend and revise them. and even oc-
casionally rescind them. 11 6 Researchers who free themselves 
from a consistent data collection rule face an extremely wide 
range of potential starting and ending points for any particular 
rule making. For example, as I note in Assessing Consensus, the 
negotiated rulemaking over drinking water standards for disin-
fectant byproducts had, by 1996, resulted in a final rule governing 
the collection of drinking water information even though the 
substantive drinking water standards based on the negotiations 
still remained as proposed rules. 11 7 I use the date of the "first 
final rule to emerge from this negotiated rulemaking process, 
even though it is an information collection rule and not a drink-
ing water standard " simply to ensure that my estimates are em-
ployed consis tently and conservatively. 11 8 The farmworker 
protection rule is yet another example of a rulemaking that did 
not really end with the promulgation of a final rule. As I note in 
Asses5;ing Consensus, debate over the farm worker protection 
rule persists: "EPA has issued extensions and changes to the rule, 
11 4 5 u.s.c. § 704 (1994). 
ll:i Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89. a t 603. 
116 For example, consider. th e Nat iona l Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion·s passenger restraint requirements which the age ncy rescinded in 1981. See 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass' n of Am. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S . 
29, 34-40 (1983) (noting that "the requirement has been imposed. amended , 
rescinded , reimposed , and now rescind ed again" and giving detail ed history). 
117 Drinking Water Information Collection Rul e , 61 Feel. Reg. 24.354 (May 
14, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141); Enhanced Surface Water Treat-
ment Requirements, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,832 (proposed July 29, 1994) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. 141, 142) ; Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 38,668 (proposed July 29, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 141. 142). 
118 Cogli anese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2. a t 1283 n. l20. 
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Congress has entered the fray , and outside groups have 
threatened litigation." 11 L) Opening measurement to ad hoc judg-
ments would not only enable some to claim that rulemaking was 
shorter in some cases, but it would also allow others to claim that 
rulemaking was still longer in other cases. 
The approach I take in my empirical research adheres to 
sound social science research standards in that it relies on neu-
traL consistent methods of calculating the duration of rulemak-
ing. Harter's approach, on the other hand, tips the scales in favor 
of finding a time savings for negotiated rulemaking. He makes 
adjustments that shorten the process for negotiated rulemaking, 
but he never acknowledges the need to be consistent and make 
similar adjustments to the comparison group of rules adopted 
through conventional notice-and-comment procedures.120 Har-
ter claims, for example, that an earlier ending date should be 
used for the equipment leaks rule because the EPA issued an 
early notice of the agreement in the equipment leaks rulemaking 
"so industry could begin taking actions to comply." 121 In an ear-
lier article, Harter notes that many firms "were complying with 
the rule long before it was in effect." 122 He similarly argues that 
the ending elate of the reformulated gasoline rule should be 
moved up by about eight months because that was the time when 
the EPA held a series of workshops "so that those affected could 
119 Id. at 1279 n.111. 
12o Cf. KrNc> ET AL. , supra not e 33, at 28 (noting that "deliberately choosing 
cases that support our theory" is an "obvious example" of biased empi rical in-
ference). Harter draws attention, for instance, to the fact that the Coast Guard 
issued a circular and an interim rule before it promulgated a fin a l rule in the 
negotiated rul emaking on vessel response plans. Harter, Assessing rhe Asses-
sors, supra note 5. at 43-44. Although he argues that the age ncy accomplished 
its goals by issu ing th ese interim documents, the fact is that the Coast Guard 
st ill made significant modifications before promulgating the final rule , indicat-
ing th at the agency had not in fact satisfied all its goals. See Vesse l Response 
Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 1052 (Jan. 12, 1996) (discussing su bstantive changes made to 
interim rule). More significantly, even assuming that an interim rule were a 
meaningful end point for a rulcmaking that generates a s ubsequent final rule, 
one would need to recogn ize th at the issuance of interim rul es is not uncommon 
in current conven tional rulemaking practices. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, In-
terim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slo·wly, 51 ADMIN. L. R Ev. 703. 712-15 (1999) 
(documenting the increasing use of interim rules by administrative agencies). 
To be consistent, analysts need to make similar judgments about the ending 
points for conventional rulemaking processes, which with some frequency in-
clude the issuance of interim guidances along the way to a final rule. Harter 
does not do this. 
121 Harter, Assessing the Assesso rs. supra note 5, at 46. 
122 Harter. Fear of Commitm ent, supra note 5, 1427 app. B. 
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comply." 123 Yet what Harter fails to acknowledge is that regu-
lated entities often take steps to comply with looming environ-
mental regulations well in advance of agency rules coming into 
effect. In many corporations and trade associations , lawyers and 
managers regularly work to anticipate the EPA's regulatory 
agenda , taking steps to bring their organizations and members 
into compliance before the final rules take effect. 124 This is espe-
cially the case with regard to regulations affecting equipment or 
production processes, as compliance can require significant capi-
tal expenditures and lead time for planning. It is in firms' inter-
ests to avoid the risk of business interruption or regula tory 
liability, so firms often plan ahead and begin taking steps to com-
ply after an agency issues a proposed or interim rule or otherwise 
signals its regulatory direction. 12s 
OveralL H arter presents his data in such a way as to favor 
negotiated rulemaking. He argues that if one negotiated rule is 
excluded from study, and if the duration of two other rules is 
shortened, the average duration of the EPA's negotiated 
rulemakings is only 751 days instead of 1,013 days, or thirty-five 
percent shorter than the average duration reported in my 
study. 126 This reduction in average duration arises because the 
123 H ar ter. Assessing th e Assessors, sup ra note 5, at 48. 
124 See, e.g., Vicki Norberg-Bohm & Mark Rossi, Th e Power of In cremenwl-
ism: Environmental R egulation and Technological Change in Pulp and Paper 
Bleaching in rhe US, 10 T EcH. ANALYSIS & STRATEG IC MGMT. 225, 227 (1998) 
(noting that "innovation may begin prior to actua l promulgation of e nviron -
mental stand ards"); Nicholas A. Ashford & G eorge R. Heaton , Regulation and 
Technological Innovarion in the Ch emical Industry , 46 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PRoss. 109, 120 ( 1983) (notin g that the anticipation of the new regulations 
often prompts fi rms to m ake technological changes and come into substanti al 
compliance well before th e regulations are full y promulgated). 
125 See F oREST L. RE INHARDT, DowN TO EARTH: A PPLYI NG BusiNESS PRIN-
CIPLES TO ENVIRON MENTAL MANAGEMENT 140-55 (2000) (describing firm s that 
installed equipment in advance of the imposition of regulatory requirements) . 
126 Har ter, Assessing rh c Assessors, supra note 5, at 57 tbl.l. Harter also 
states tha t the average duration of a ll negotiated rulem aking-by EPA as we ll 
as o ther agencies-sho ul d be lowered . H e achieves this claimed reel uction by 
truncating th e duratio n of the Coast G uard Vessel Response Plan rulemaking, 
see supra note 120, and by excl uding from the se t of negoti ated rules O SHA 's 
rulemaking on occ upa tion a l ex posure to benzene . H e claims it is inappropriate 
to include the benzene negotiations beca use O SHA never sent a representative 
to participate in them. Harter, Asssessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 22 
n.88. While it is true that OSHA did not take an active role as a participant in 
this negotiated rulemaking. " (t]his kind of agency nonparti cipa tion had been 
recognized as one of the two basic forms of negotiated rulemaking." Perritt, 
supra note 16, at 1660. See also H enry H. Perritt , J r., Administrative A lternative 
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one rule that Harter argues should be excluded-the farmworker 
protection rule-happened to be the negotiated rulemaking with 
the longest duration. In addition, the two other rules-the 
equipment leaks and reformulated gasoline rules-were among 
those negotiated rules with the longest durations. Harter also 
questions the elates I use to calculate the duration of a fourth 
rule-the drinking water collection rule-although he does not 
change the elates I use in making his alternative calculation. 127 In 
all, Harter disputes my time computations for the four EPA ne-
gotiated rules that had the longest rulemaking duration. 
Due to the nature of an average (or mean) as a statistical 
measure, the average duration of negotiated rulemaking would 
indeed drop substantially if one were to remove the longest ne-
gotiated rulemaking from the group and also considerably 
shorten the duration of other rulemakings that took a longer 
time. This is explainable as a property of the statistic, since aver-
ages tend to be sensitive to outlying cases. Indeed, when analyz-
ing a distribution of data with outliers in only a positive 
direction-such as with income or time, which can never be less 
than zero-the average will tend to be pulled upwarcls. 128 In 
such cases, the median will generally be a more suitable indicator 
of the typical case, as it is less sensitive to extreme outliers. 129 It 
is especially appropriate for a researcher to report the median in 
these cases, something that I did and Kerwin and Furlong did, 
but Harter did not. 
As Table 1 shows, Kerwin and Furlong report an average 
rulemaking duration (1108 days) that was higher than the median 
duration (872 days). My analysis results in a similar distribution: 
a higher average duration for EPA's negotiated rulemakings 
Dispute Resolution: The Development of Negotiated Rulemakirzg and Other 
Processes, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 863, 881 (1987) (noting that Harter recognizes that 
negotiated rulemaking can occur without the participation of the agency). Per-
ritt included the benzene negotiations in his evaluations of negotiated rulemak-
ing. See id. at 874. ACUS also included this rule in all its lists of federal agency 
negotiated rulemakings. ACUS, 1990 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 80 , at 336; 
ACUS, 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 382; ACUS, BuiLDING CoNSENsus, 
supra note 80, at 50. 
127 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 48. 
128 See NEIL A. WEISS, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 129-30 (5th ed. 1999). 
129 See id. at 130 (showing that the median is a more resistant descriptive 
statistic, meaning that it is less sensitive to the influence of a few extreme data 
points). Accord Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 610-11 (acknowledging 
that the median is the better measure of the typical number of comments filed 
on proposed rules when there are outliers). 
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TABLE 1: 
DuRATION or: E PA R u LEMAK I N GS (rN DA Y S ) 
Average Duratio n 
Med ian Duration 
Conve nti onal Rules 
(Kerwin & Furlong) 
li OS ' 
872" 
" Kerwin & Furlong. supra note 40. at 134. 




" Coglian ese. A ssessing Consensus . supra no te 2. a t 1283-84. 
'!d. at 1284 n.l 23 . 
d Harter. A ssessing the As.1essnrs. supra no te 5. a t 57. 
Nego tiated Rules 
(Harter) 
(1013 days) than a median duration for these same rules (872 
days). This suggests tha t conventional rulemaking has had its 
outlying cases, just as has negotiated rulemaking. Harter's aver-
age for negotiated rulemaking is different , but only because he 
has truncated the data on negotiated rulemakings . Even though 
Harter 's average duration is substantially lower than what I find, 
his median duration for negotiated rulemaking, not surprisingly, 
differs very little. 131) When the data are properly analyzed, the 
median-as well as th e average- duration of EPA's negotiated 
rulemakings is only nine ty-five days shorter than the respective 
data from Kerwin and Furlong's comparison group. It should be 
remembered, of course , that by using the notice of intent to ne-
gotiate as the starting point for each rule , rather than EPA's in-
ternal records (the Kerwin and Furlong approach), 131 my study 
understates the duration of negotiated rulemaking by about 131 
clays compared with the approach used by Kerwin and 
Furlong. 132 
l ] IJ The median durat ion I re ported for the twe lve EPA negotiated rules was 
777 days, while the med ian durati on calculated using the numbers claimed by 
H arter is 743 cl ays. Coglianese. Assessing Consensus, Sllpra note 2, at 1284 
n.l23: Harter, Assessing th e Assessors, supra note 5, a t 57 tbl.l. This would 
m ea n th a t by Harter 's computati o ns nego tiated rulem ak ing yields a t best only 
about fo ur months savings in medi an dura tion . 
131 K e rwin a nd Furlong relied on EPA's "e la borate inte rnal m anagement 
m echanism ," which, according to Ke rwin and Furlong, has " reliabl e historical 
fil es on each rul e makin g." Kerwin & Furlong. supra note 40, at 119-20. 
1~2 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus. supra note 2, a t 1283. Furthermore , the 
findings from an independent stud y of rul emaking durat ion, conduct ed by polit-
ical scientists Steven Balla a nd John Wright , confirm the basic conclusio n that 
negotiated rulemaking does not sh orten th e regulatory process . Afte r compar-
ing the duration of rul e makings co mpleted using differe nt forms of public par-
ticipation, Balla a nd Wright conclucl e : 
Ou r rese arch demonstra tes ... that rules to whi ch regul atory negotia tion 
was appli ed took longer to issue th an those d eveloped through conven-
tional proceedings. des pite th e fact agenci es were more likely to conduct 
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C. Nego tiated Rulemaking Demands J\llo re Time and Effort 
by Participants 
No matter what one concludes about the impact of negoti-
ated rulemaking on the duration of the regulatory process , nego-
tiated rulemaking still demands more time and effort on the part 
of the participants than does conventional rulem aking. 133 Even 
if th e overall duration of negotiated rul emakings could be shown 
to be shorter ,134 the intensity of negot ia ted rulemakings still 
translates into additional time. A s Harte r himse lf acknowledges, 
'' [r] eg negs are inte nse acti vities: participating in one can be ex-
pensive and time consuming. '' 135 The Langbein and Kerwin 
study , which Harter considers ·'rigorous" and "careful,'' 136 shows 
that participants in negotiated rulemak ings report spending 
nearly twice as much overall in organi zat ional resources as did 
their counterparts in conventional rulemakings. 137 Strikingly, 
participants in nego tiated rulemakings a re three times more 
likely to complain that the process takes too much time and ef-
fort. 138 Whatever one makes of the impact of negotiation on the 
duration of rulemakings, there is no disputing that negotiated 
rulem aking is much more burdensome , in terms of the overall 
time and expense , than conventional rulemaking. 139 
regu latory negoti a tions in situati ons that wt;rc a me nable to relatively 
ra pid resolutio n . In gene ra l. we find no e vid e nce that consensua l 
rule makin g reduces the time it tak es to deve lo p rul es. 
Balla & Wrigh t, supra note 107, a t 26-27. 
13.:; As Laura Langbe in and Jocly Freeman pu t it , ·'[ t]his is one clai m about 
reg neg that has no counte rclaim .·' Jo cl y Freeman & La ura I. Langbe in , R egula-
ror_v Negotiation and th e Legitimacy Benefit , 9 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 60, 109 
(2000). See also Mark Seiclenfelcl. Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collab -
oration os the Basis for Flexible Regulorion, 41 W M. & M ARY L R Ev. 411 , 457 
(2000) (o bserving that " all com men tators ag ree th a t negotiated rule making is 
an int ensive process requiring a concen tra ted devotion o f resources by the 
age ncy and priva te negotiation participants"). 
134 As discussed in Part Il.B , the evidence does no t support such a 
conclusio n. 
us H arter. Fear of Comrnitmenr , supra no te 5, a t 1420. See also id. at 1421 
(ad mitting th a t negotiated rule ma king " is unqu es tionably a n intense process" ). 
!36 Harter. Assessing rhe Assesso rs, supra not e 5, a t 55-56. 
137 Langbe in & Kerwin , supra note 89. a t 620. 
138 !d. 
U9 See, e.g. , Freem a n & Langbe in, supra note l33, at 97 n.176 (acknowledg-
ing the '· resource-intensive nature of reg neg"): CoRN ELI US M. KERWIN , 
RuL FMA KI NG : H ow G ovERN!viENT AG ENCIES \V RtTE LAw AND MAKE PoucY 
190 (1 st e el. 1994) (observing th a t negotia ted rul e making demands an "ex-
traordinary commitm e nt o f tim e" from individua ls and th at ' ' negotia tion ses-
s ions th e mselves are de mandin g activities that can wreak havoc with norm al 
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III 
NEGOTIATED R ULEMAKING AND THE AVOIDANCE 
OF LITIGATION 
Over the years, advocates of nego tiated rulemaking consist-
ently claimed that the procedure would eliminate subsequent liti-
gation filed challenging administrative rules .140 Yet until I 
undertook my research, no one had sought to assess these claims 
by collecting comprehensive data on court filin gs for negotiated 
and conventional rules. Having collected this data for the EPA, I 
find that six out of the twelve completed EPA negotiated rules in 
my study have resulted in legal challenges , a litigation rate higher 
than that for all significant rules under EPA's major statutes and 
almost twice as high as that for EPA rules generally. 14 1 Harter 
does not dispute that these challenges to negotiated rules were 
filed.l4 2 Rather, he claims that negotiated rulemaking was never 
really meant to reduce litigation.143 He also claims that I fail to 
account for differences in litigation and that when these differ-
ences are considered, negotiated rulemaking results in less pro-
tracted litigation. 144 In this Part, I demonstrate that Harter is 
wrong on both counts: negotiated rulemaking has long aimed to 
reduce legal challenges to agency rules and it has fa iled to reduce 
both the number and intensity of these challenges. 
work responsibili ties"); Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Per-
spective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst. ) 10,647, 10,651 (Oct. 1992) (" A major 
disadvantage of the reg-neg process is th at it can be extreme ly resource-inten-
sive and stressful. "); ACUS, BuiLDING CoNSENsus, supm note 80, a t 28 (re-
porting that the D epartment of Agriculture has found nego tiated rul emaking to 
be "expensive") ; OFFICE o F THE VrcE PRES IDENT, supra note 42, at 31-32 
("The most significant de terrent to using negotiated rulemaking is its up-front 
cost. . .. [T)he concentrated in vestment of e ffort and expe nse in th e short term 
may be a serious obstacle ."); Program E valuat ion Division, supra note 78, at 23, 
30 (noting that "EPA managers who have been the Agency's negoti ators have 
devoted far more time to the negotiations in which they were involved than 
th ey ordinarily would spend on a single rulemaking effort"). 
I40 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
141 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus , supra note 2, at 1298-1301. 
142 Harter even quotes a passage from Langbein and Kerwin in which they 
state that "negot iated rules appear no more (or less) subject to li tigation than 
conventional rules ." Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 55 (q uot-
ing Langbein & Kerwin , supra note 89, at 625). Langbein and Kerwin acknowl-
edge that there is "little difference" in the litigation rates for negotiated rules 
and conventional rules. Langbein & Kerwin , supra note 89, at 614-15. 
143 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
144 See infra notes 180-192. 
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A. Avoiding Litigation Has Long Been a Goal of 
Negotiated Rulemaking 
Harter suggests that it really does not matter that negotiated 
rulemaking has failed to prevent litigation. According to Harter, 
negotiated rulemaking was not originally intended to reduce liti-
gation. For example, he asserts that "those who were present at 
the creation of reg-neg sought neither expedition nor a shield 
against litigation." 145 Yet negotiation has long been offered, 
even in the early years, as an alternative that would reduce the 
perceived adversarial relationship between business and govern-
ment.146 Former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop initiated inter-
est in negotiated rulemaking in the 1970s by calling attention to 
several problems with government regulation, one of which was 
"the legal game-playing between the regulatees and the regula-
tors." 147 According to Dunlop, typically the "regulatory agency 
promulgates a regulation; the regulatees challenge it in court; if 
they lose, their lawyers may seek to find another ground for ad-
ministrative or judicial challenge."148 He urged regulators to in-
volve affected parties in the development of new rules so as to 
reduce the contentiousness, delays, and lawsuits that he per-
ceived to be afflicting the regulatory process. 149 
Philip Harter himself, in his original article on negotiated 
rulemaking, advocated negotiated rulemaking as a cure for a 
"bitterly ad versa rial" 150 regulatory process: 
Negotiations may reduce judicial challenges to a rule because 
those parties most directly affected, who are also the most 
likely to bring suits, actually would participate in its develop-
ment. Indeed, because the rule would reflect the agreement of 
the parties, even the most vocal constituencies should support 
145 Harter. Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 54. 
146 See. e.g., Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confronration or Negotiation?, 
HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1981, at 86, 91-92 (noting a substantial increase in 
the number of regulatory lawyers in Washington, D.C., and advocating regula-
tory negotiation as a solution to the "fruitless confrontation" and "protracted 
regulatory battles" perpetuated by lawyers); Peter H. Schuck, Litigation, Bar-
gaining, and Regulation, REGULATION, July-August 1979, at 26 (urging negotia-
tion to avoid the ''chronic fractiousness" of policymaking in the United States). 
See also Harter, Cure for lvfalaise, supra note 1, at 18 n.96 (citing early work 
complaining of adversarial relationships between business and government). 
147 John T. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67, 71 
(1976). 
148 Id. 
149 Jd. at 72. 
150 Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 1, at 18. 
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th e rule . This abstract prediction finds support in expe ri e nce 
in anal ogous contexts. Fo r example, there has been virtu a ll y 
no judicial revi ew of OSHA 's recent safety st andards that 
we re based on a consensus a mong the inte res ted pa rti es. 
Mo reove r, rules resulting from se ttlements have no t been 
ch a llenge c! .15 1 
Moreover, according to Judge Loren Smith, chairman of ACUS 
at the ti me the Conference acted on H arter 's report, "when we 
passed the first recommenda tion [encouraging agencies to use 
negoti ated rulema king]. . . , the Reaga n A dministration 's whole 
purpose on nego tiated rulemaking was to keep th ings out of the 
courts. " 152 In chronicling EPA's decision to launch its regulatory 
nego tiation project in 1983 , D aniel Fiorino and Chris Kirtz ob-
served tha t the ACUS recommend ation was one of the factors 
prompting E PA to pursue nego tiated rulemaking.15 :> Further-
more , they point explicitly to the desire by E PA officials to re-
duce litigation: 
[P] e rh aps mos t importantl y, people within th e E PA we re be-
coming more aware o f the limits of conventional , advc rsa rial 
rul emaking under the Administrative Procedure A ct. T he 
standard rulem ak ing process h ac! become too susce ptible to 
151 !d . a t 102 ( footn o tes o mitted) . See also supra no te 13 a nd acco m panying 
text. H arte r d id nevertheless origi nally predict tha t negotia ted rule s wo uld be 
subjected to some litiga ti o n ; however, ove r time he has beco me eve n more fe r-
ve nt in asse rting tha t nego ti ated rul es are res istant to legal challe nge . See Cog-
li a nese. Assessing Consensus , supra no te 2 , a t 1295 n .l 79 (no ting th e shi ft in 
H ar ter 's claims abo ut litigation). 
152 Co ll oquium, The Fifth A nnual Robert C. B yrd Confe rence on the Adrnin-
islrarive Process: The Firsr Year of C!inron!Gore: ReinvenTing Governm em o r 
R efining R eagan/ Bush ln irimives?, 8 ADM IN. L.J. AM. U. 23 , 62 ( 1994) (s tate -
m e nt by Judge Loren Smith ). 
153 See D a ni e l J. Fio rin o & Chri s Ki rtz, B reak ing Down Walls: N egoriated 
Ru lenwk ing 111 E PA, 4 TE MP. E NVTL L. & TecH. J . 29 , 29 (1985 ) . O ne of th e 
lead ing figures in the development of th e regul atory negot ia ti o n project at 
E PA, Jose ph C an non, a pparently was motivated by h is com mi tment to ·· the 
idea th a t ma ny disp utes were best reso lved o ut of court. ' ' Sussk ind & McMa-
hon . supru no te 101. at 142 n.53. E PA Ad ministrator Lee 1l10 m as si mila rlv· 
stressed E PA's des ire to sho rte n rulemak ing time a nd red uce liti gat ion <{s 
among the chi ef reasons fo r the agency's reg ulatory negotiat ion in itiative. Lee 
M. T homas, The Successful Use of R egulatory Negoriarion , supra no te 77. a t 3. 
Furthermo re, the tra ining m ateri a l EPA provided to pa rticipants in its seco nd 
negot iated rul e mak ing descri bed E PA 's R egulatory Negotia tio n Projec t as a n 
opportu nity to '' test whe ther nego tiation at a n early stage o f rule m ak in g ca n 
produce rul es more qui ckly, less expensive ly. a nd with less likel ih o od of li tiga-
tio n." EPA, T RAINING SESSION oN NEGOTIATING T EcHN IQUES FOR THE P EST I-
CID E E xErvtPTION NEGOTIATING CoMMITTEE 1 (Sept. 27 . 1984). reprinred in 
ACUS. 1995 SouRCEBOO K, sup ra no te 4, a t 199 , 202 . 
I 
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de lay and litiga ti o n. As man y as 80 perce nt of EPA's final 
rul es are challenged- often by both sides of an issue. A pilot 
program o n regul atory nego tiation offered an opportunity to 
tes t an alternative me thod for proposin g Age ncy rules that 
wo uld permit all participants a face-to-face ro le in decision-
making.1"4 
As one can plainly see . the ai m of avoiding lit igatio n motivated 
both the ori gi nal ACUS recommendat ion urging agencies to pur-
sue negotiated rulemaking and EPA's decisio n to launch its regu-
latory negotiation project. 
Admittedly. over the years advocates of negotiated rul emak-
ing have claimed a number of additional benefits from negoti-
a ted rul emaking, 1"" but fro m the very beginning proponents have 
consistently claimed that it will reduce legal chall enges to agency 
rules .156 Numero us practitioners , academics. legislators , and 
agency offici als h;we advoca ted negotiated rulemaking as a way 
of reducing subsequent litiga tion , which many erroneously 
thought had reached the point where groups chall enged four o ut 
of every five regu lat ions EPA issued. 157 The Negotiated 
Rulernaking Act included in its preamble the goal of reducing 
the likelihood of litiga ti on. 1" 8 In addition, R ep ublican and Dem-
ocratic administrations endorsed the use of negotiated rulemak-
ing, in no small part because of the belief tha t the procedure 
15.J Fiorino & Kirtz. supra note 153. at 29 . 
155 For exam ple. in a recent di scussio n of EPA 's public participation efforts, 
Char les Fox of EPA op in ed that th e rules his agency negotiated have been 
'·more pract ical and cost efficient, contained more innovative solutions. were 
more technica lly and sci en ti fica ll y current, and had greater legitimacy." J. 
Char les Fox, A R eal Public Role. 15 ENVTL. F. 19.24 (1998). He a lso asse rted 
that negotia ted rulcmaking has saved th e agency time and ha s preven ted litiga -
tion. Jd. 
156 Fo r a de tai led account of the emp hasis placed o n litigatio n avoid ance in 
the legislat ive hi story lead in g up to the Nego tia ted Rul em aking Act of 1990 and 
its permanent reauthorizat io n in 1996, see Cogli anese, Assessing Consensus, 
supra note 2. a t 1262-71. 
157 For an extensive bibliography of this literat ure. see id. a t 1343 app. D. 
T'h e refrai n of Lawrence Susskind ret1ects the tenor of the lite ra ture: "All too 
often government regulati ons e nd up as the subject of lawsuits. We could re -
duce this wrangling if the op posing sides drafted th e regulations toge ther .' ' 
Susskind & Van Dam. supra note L a t 38. 
158 The Negot iated Rule making Act of 1990. supra note 16, Pub. L. No. 
101-648, § 2(5). 104 Stat. 4969 ("Nego tia ted rulcmak ing can increase th e ac-
ceptability and improve th e substance of ru les , making it less likely that the 
affected parties wil l resist enforcement or cha llenge such ru les in co urt. "). 
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would minimize litigation. 159 Advocates have consistently em-
phasized negotiated rulemaking' s potential for reducing litiga-
tion, and even the earliest "pioneers" of the process have 
boasted (inaccurately) that the negotiation process has "almost 
eliminated" subsequent litigation 160 and that "no rule crafted m 
this manner has been subj ected to court action." 161 
B. Negotinted Rulenwking Has Failed to Reduce Litigation 
Even though H arter erroneously suggests that it does not 
really mat ter that negotiated rulemaking has generated a consid-
erable number of legal challenges ,162 he nevertheless makes sev-
eral fo rcefully worded, but mistaken, criticisms of my analysis of 
negotiated rulemaking and litigation. 163 For example, he first ac-
cuses me of "significantly misleading'' the reader by including a 
di scussion of th e Grand Canyon visibility negotiation in Assess-
ing Consensus, because it was not technically a negotiated 
rulemaking. 164 At the same time, however , he readily acknowl-
edges tha t my article " points out that this rule was not developed 
159 The Clinton A dministrati on's Nati onal Performance R eview urged the 
use of negot iated rulem a king as an e ffective a lternative to a rule m a king process 
th at. in lan guage H arte r quotes , "enco urages adversarial , uncoopera tive behav-
io r on the par t of priva te industry or o thers who might be affec ted by an 
agency's decisio ns, which freque ntly leads to protracted litiga ti on. " O FFICE oF 
TH E Vt c E PRESIDENT, sup ra note 42. at 29, quoted in Harter, Assessing the A s-
sessors, supra note 5, a t 37. In addition to signing the rea uth o ri za tio n of the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act , President Clinton also issued several direct ives to 
age ncies to use negotiated rulemaking. See Exec. O rder No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 
§§ 638, 642-43 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §§ 601, 644-645 (1 994); Negotiated 
Rulem aking. Memorandum for E xec utive D epartments and Se lected Agencies 
[and the] Adm inistra tor of th e Office of Information and R egula tory Affairs, 58 
Fed. R eg. 52.391 (Oct. 7, 1993) ; President 's Memorandum on Regulatory Re-
form. 1995 Pus. PAPE RS 304,305 (Mar. 4, 1995) : President William C linton and 
Vice Preside nt A lber t Gore, R ein vent ing E nvironmental R egul ation 5, 9 (1 995) 
(available fro m th e E LR D oc. Se rv. , E LR Order No . AD-979) . Presiden t B ush 
signed the origina l Negotiated Rulemaking Act, sta ting that negotiated 
rulemaking would provide "a m eans of avoiding cos tly and time-consuming liti-
ga ti on." P res ident 's S tatemen t on Signing the Negoti a ted Rul em aking Act of 
1990. 1990 Pus. PAPERS 1716 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
160 Jo J-I N T. DuNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 
OF E!VIPLO YiviENT DISPUTES 48 (1997). 
161 Philip J. Harter & Daniel Finkelstein, The Co ke Ovens' Regulatory N ego-
EiL7lion: Fron1 Choking Controversy to Consensus R elief, 2 J. ENYTL. PEIU.HT-
TI NC 343, 345 (1 993). 
162 See sup ra Part III. A . 
163 Harte r, Assessing rhe Assessors, supra note 5, at 52 (asserting tha t " Cog-
li anese paints a substantially misleadi ng picture "). 
164 Jd. at 50. 
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under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. " 165 In addition to stating 
that the rule was not technically a negotiated rulemaking under 
the Act, I also expressly exclude the Grand Canyon rule when 
calculating and discussing the overall litigation rate for EPA's ne-
gotiated rules. 166 Nevertheless, mentioning the litigation over 
the Grand Canyon rule as I do is far from misleading- it is rele-
vant and highly probative support fo r the proposition that "rules 
promulgated following a regulatory nego tiation are far from im-
mune from legal chall e nge ." 167 The Grand Canyon rule was 
probably the most we ll publicized of any EPA regulatory negoti-
ation , having concluclec! with a dramatic presidential ceremony 
near the edge of the Grand Canyon and prompting a front-page 
New York Times article hailing the negotiation process as a 
model alternative to the "lawsuit system." 168 tv1oreover, at the 
time of my original research, the Grand Canyo n rule had been 
heralded as a negotiated rulemaking success story by one of the 
sponsors of the Senate bill permanently reauthorizing the Nego-
tiated Rulemaking Act. 169 At that time , however, the rulemak-
ing had been discussed in the legal literature only "as a prototype 
'win-win' solution of an environmental problem and a model for 
other regulatory negotiations." 170 Thus, including mention of the 
Grand Canyon litiga tion actually helps to correct the misleading 
impression that regul atory negotiation eliminates subsequent le-
gal challenges to agency rules. 
165 !d. Indeed, I note at the outset of my discussion of this prominent regula-
tory negotiation that it was "not conducted und er the auspices of the Negoti -
a ted Rul emaking Act." Cogli anese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1288. 
In a footnote , I elaborate that E PA did not invoke the Nego tia ted Rulemaking 
Act because th e negoti a ti ons occurred after , instead of before, the publica tion 
of the proposed rule. !d. at 1288 n.l38. 
166 !d. at 1301-1302. 
167 !d. at 1287. 
J6S See Matthew L. Walcl , U.S. Agencies Use Negotimions ro Pree1 
Suits Over Rules, N.Y. T1:--,1Es , Sept. 23 , 1991 , at A1, quored in Cogliar 
sessing Consensus, supra note 2. at 1289 (describing th e Grand Canyon 
rule). 
169 Gov't Press R elease . Cfi!1{on Signs Levin 's Bill Encouraging Govf 
Inn ovarion (Oct. 21, 1996) , available at 1996 WL 11125786 (press release 
by Senator Carl Levin). 
170 D . Michael Rappoport & John F. Cooney . Visibilit_v ar the Grand C 
Regulatory Nego tiations Under rh e Clean Air Act , 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 62 
(1992). 
422 N.Y.U. ENVJRON!VI ENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 9 
H arter also charges that I fail to look into the details sur-
rounding the challenged nego tiated rules and their litigation. 171 
TI1is claim is yet another example of Harter's advocacy. Even a 
cursory reading of Assessing Consensus reveals that I devote con-
siderable attention to the de tails surrounding all six EPA negoti-
ated rulemakings th at were subject to legal action , stating exactly 
who filed each petition fo r review, why , and to what effect. 172 
Harter 's claim that I fail to look at what ha ppened in these cases 
is all the more interesting since he himself provides only two 
paragraphs in his article to the litigated rules, compared with the 
more than ei ght pages contained in my original article. 173 He de-
votes a mere eleven words to the litigation challenging the disin-
fectant byproducts rul e compared with the page and a half I 
devote to that rule and its subsequent legal challenge. 174 
Perhaps because his own discussion of the challenged rules 
is so brief. H arter creates some confusion about the litigation 
filed against the reformulated gasoline rule and the equipment 
leaks rule. 175 Without denying that court pe titions were filed 
171 H arter. A ssessing the Assessors, supra no te 5, a t 50 (asserting that "Cog-
lianese fails to loo k at either what happe ned in the negotiated rulem aking itself 
or the na ture o f the challenges'·). 
172 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus . supra not e 2 a t 1290-92. 1302-1308. 
173 Compore H arte r . Assessing tlz e Assessors. supra note 5, at 50-52, with 
Coglianese, A ssessing Consensus , sup ra no te 2. at 1290-92, 1302-1 308. 
! 7-l Com pare H arte r, Assessing the A ssessors. supra note 5, at 51 , with Cog-
li anese. Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1306-l307. I recognize that for 
some readers it may seem unusual to compare th e number of words or p ages 
co ntained in scholarly articl es, but the stark contrast in th e volume of text al one 
provides a clear indication of the degree to which r provide background info r-
m ation about E PA 's challenged negotiated rulemakings. This point bears em-
phasizing since Freeman and Langbein have echoed Harte r 's charges , criticizing 
my stu dy fo r failing to provide "contextual de tails" while characterizing Har-
ter 's brief treatment as " a de tail ed analysis of th e circumst ances surroundin g a 
varie ty of challenges to negot iated rules ." Freeman & Langbein , supra note 
l33. a t l45 n.357 a nd accompanying text. T he rea lity is that Harter gives scant 
attention to th ese challenges. and offers no new information, whil e I p rovide 
more detailed info rmati on abo ut all the challenges to E PA 's nego tiated rules 
than found anywhere else in the litera ture. 
175 In this b rief disc ussion H arte r a lso m anages to make anot he r mistake . In 
a foo tn ote to his discussio n o f EPA's negotia ted rule making on the und er-
ground inj ectio n o f hazardo us \vastes (initi a ted und er R C RA) , he confuses this 
negotiated rul em aking with one that E PA proposed , but ultimately abandoned. 
o n und erground injection control for Class II wells in co nnection with oil and 
gas drilling (initia ted under the Safe Drinking Water A ct). In his discussion of 
the RCRA rule, Harter suggests that I mistakenly treat the SDWA rul e as aban-
don ed and claims that the la tter was also negotiated. H arte r. Assessing the A s-
sessors . supra note 5. a t 51 n.97 (asserting that the Class II underground 
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challenging these rules, he nevertheless mistakenly implies that 
the challenges I attribute to these two rul es were actually filed 
against related, but distinct EPA rules that were not negoti-
atecl. 170 Yet, even tho ugh petitions were filed against related 
inj ection contro l negotiated rulcmaki ng ·· continued to full term but no agree-
ment was reached"). Yet th e record is clear that EPA really did aba ndon the 
SDWA negot iated rulemaking on CIC~ss li wel ls. EPA's own internal lists of its 
nego tiated rul emaking do not even me nti o n the Cl ass ll underground injection 
co ntro l matte r. See, e.g.. EPA, Nu~OTL-\TED R uL.Ei'vl i\KTNC AT THE E".:v moN-
'-"lENT!\l_ PROTECTION A GENCY 4 (Mm. 1992) (on fil e with th e auth or): EPA , 
Nicc;OT!i\TED RULEMAK ING ;\ T TH E E:o--: ViRON\ II:: NT;\L PROTFCTI O:-..: AGENCY 5 
(Oc t. 1992) (on fil e with the author): EPA. Nc: c oTJATED R LLEMAK INC AT TH F 
EN VIRON:VIENTJ\L PROT ECTION AGENCY 6 (Nov. !o. 1994 ) (on fil e with the au-
thor). The ACUS list of EPA's negoti ated rulemakings docs mention the issue. 
but notes that even though ·'EPA considered establishing a committee to nego-
tialL' rules under the Safe Drinking Wate r Act, pertaining to und erground injec-
ti on co ntrol associa ted with oil and gas production[. t]hc agency subsequently 
decided not to go forward with negotiations , but did form a committee to give 
advice on options.'' ACUS. 1995 So uRCLBOO K, supra note 4, at 392 . EPA did 
initi all y indicate its inclination to move forward to propose amendments to its 
underground inj ection control rules for Class Tl we ll s using a nego tiated 
rul cmaking process. See Underground Inj ection Con troL Class II. Well s: Intent 
to Form an Advisory Committee to Nego tiate Amendments to Regulations. 56 
Feel. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 7, 1991). However. only a few months later EPA deter-
mined that it was not sure that amendments to these rul es were ye t warranted 
and decided that it would not proceed with a negot iated rulemaking. See Un-
derground Inj ection ControL Class II. Wells; Intent to Form an Advisory Com-
mittee to Reso lve Issues R elated to the Class ll Program. 56 Feel. Reg. L4 ,52L 
14.521 (Apr. 10. 1991). Instead it established an advi so ry committee to consider 
the .. potential" for creating new amendments to the Class II well program. See 
Establi shme nt and Open Mee ting of the EPA Advisory Committee fo r Class II 
Underground Inj ection Control Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,672, 26,673 (June 10, 
199 1 ). The Federal Register notice of the first meeting of this advisory commit-
tee nowhere mentions that the committee was proceeding with a negotiated 
rulemaking. See 56 Feel . Reg. at 26 ,673. My interview notes, taken in the 
course of conducting my research for Assessing Consensus , indicate th a t the key 
EPA staff member involved in this process reported that about seven advisory 
committee meetings were held from th e middle of 199 1 to early 1992 , but that 
by the mid-1 990s EPA made a decision to abandon any further efforts to con-
sider new Class II well regul ations for the oil ancl gas industry. 
176 On the reformulated gaso line rule . Harter states that " [t]here were indeed 
a number of challenges to the oppiicarion of th e rule , but amazingly few chal-
lenges to the rule itself. " Harter, Assessing rhe Assesso rs, supra note 5, at 50 
(footnotes omitted) (citing the challenge to the renewabl e oxygenates compan-
ion rule in connection with the "applicatio n of the rul e") (emphasis added). On 
thc equipment leaks rul e, Harter admits that it was challenged, but suggests 
that the challenge may have been to other portions of the Hazardous Organics 
NESHAPS (HON) rule, to which the equipment leaks rule was attached. Har-
ter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 51 (assert ing that "a challenge to 
ot her parts of the HON should not be ascribed to th e Equipment Leaks part of 
the rule' '). Following Harter 's example, Freeman and Langbein also ciaim that 
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rules , court records in both cases show that petitioners also chal-
lenged the very rules which were developed through negotiated 
rulemaking. 177 Although those who advoca te . negotiated 
rulemaking have crea ted some ambiguity on this point , the fact is 
that the reformulated gasoline rule itself was challenged 178 as was 
the equipment leaks portion of the HON rule which was devel -
oped through negotiated rulemaking.17 l) 
Finally , H arter claims that I fail to distinguish "substantive 
challenges" from other kind of challenges, and that negotiated 
rules have been "remarkably resistant" to such substantive chal-
lenges .1 80 Since he never defines what he means by a "substan-
tive challenge," it not possible to test or respond to his claim 
fully. Once again , Harter's approach may well be understanda-
ble as a form of advocacy, but it is un acceptable as a basis for 
empirical analysis of negotiated rul emaking.181 If, in claiming 
that I fail to distinguish be tween "substantive" and other types of 
challenges, Harter means to imply that I fail to report that most 
of the challenges to negotiated rules were settled out of court, 
then again a casual reading of Assessing Consensus is enough to 
th e lega l challenges in these rulemak ings on ly addressed aspects that were not 
negotiated. Freeman & Langbe in , supra no te 133, at 145-46 n.212, 172 n.359 
(arguing that the litigation filed aga inst the equipment leaks and refo rmul ated 
gasoline rule only targeted aspects that were not negotiated). 
l77 See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus , supra note 2, at 1307-1308 n .246. 
l7S See, e.g. , Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 94-1138 (D .C. Ci r. filed Feb. 
24, 1994); Texaco, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1143 (D.C. Cir. fil ed Feb. 25, 1994). See 
Fina Oi l & Chern. Co. v. EPA No. 94-1142 (D .C. Cir. Feb. 25, 1994); A merada 
Hess Corp. v. EPA, No. 94-131 9 (D.C. Cir. Filed Apr. 15 , 1994); National Tank 
Truck Carriers, Inc. v. E PA, No. 94-1323 (D.C. Cir. Filed A pr. 18, 1994). See 
also Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1290-92. 
179 See A ttachment A to Settlement Agreement at 102-22, Chem . Mfrs. Ass'n 
v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir. A ug. 30, 1996), quored in Coglianese, Assessing 
Consensus , supra note 2. at J 307 n.246. See also Coglianese, Assessing Consen-
sus , supro note 2, at 1304-1305. 
tso Ha rte r claims th at '' the rules th at have emerged from negotia ted rulernak-
ing have been remarkably resistant to subst3ntive ch allenges" and that " reg-
negs have been phenomenally successful in warding off substantive review." 
Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5. at 51-52. Without any definition 
of what counts as a "substan tive" lawsuit, H arter's claims are not falsifiable, a 
centra l requiremen t for social science research. K ING ET A L. , supra note 33, at 
100-105 (explaining that social science claims must be capable of being shown 
to be wrong) . As discussed in the text inji'a, all observable indicators reveal 
that litigation filed against E PA's negotiated rules does not di ffe r in any appre-
ciable way from that filed generall y against EPA rules. 
181 Kt NG ET A L. , supra note 33, at 20 (noting that empiri ca l claims should "be 
as concrete as possible . Vaguely stated theories and hypotheses serve no pur-
pose but to obfuscate.") . 
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show that he is mistaken. 182 Harter notes that several of the 
challenges to negotiated rul es were withdrawn after settlement 
talks in several cases, but in each case I already note this in As-
sessing Consensus .183 In fact , I specifically report that "only two 
of th e six challenged rules reached an appellate panel for a deci-
sion," the rest having been voluntarily dismissed by the 
parties. 184 
I also report-and this is most crucial-that most pet itions 
for review of EPA rules are volun ta ril y dismissed by the par-
ties. 185 Indeed, settlement is more common in litiga tion chall eng-
ing EPA rules than with o ther litiga ti on. A s I report in an ea rlier 
study cited in Assessing Consensus, " [t]he se ttlement ra te for 
E PA r ule challenges in the D C Circuit . .. is nearl y twice that for 
all appeals ... and substanti a lly more th an the ra te for all admin-
istrative appeals." 186 Organizations filing suits challenging EPA 
rules often do so to preserve the opportunity to work out addi-
tional changes in the rule, aware that the underlying environmen-
tal sta tutes authorizing judicial review require such suits to be 
fil ed , if at all , within a few months of the promulgation of the 
final rule .187 For many organi zations fi ling petitions for revi ew of 
iS2 Coglianese , Assessing Consensus . supra no te 2, a t 1290-92, 1302-1307 
(descri bing legal challe nges to nego ti a ted rul es and the ir dispos ition ). Furt her-
more . a reading of an earlier study of mine, cited in Assessing Consensus, is 
enough to show th at Harter is mistaken in suggesting th at I more ge nerally 
fai led to apprecia te diffe rent kin ds o f litiga ti on . Cary Coglianese. Litigating 
Within Relationships: Disputes and D isturbance in Lhe Regularory Process, 30 
LAw & Soc'y R Ev. 735, 736-37, 753-62 (1996) [he re inafter Coglianese, Litigat-
ing With in Relationships ] (em phas izing the heterogeneity of li tigation). 
11:\-' For example, Har ter notes that. in the equipment leaks rule, the chemical 
indust ry simply " filed a defensive chall enge whil e it worked out some mino r 
de tails of th e regul a ti on. Those nego ti a ti ons we re successful and the chall enge 
was withd rawn. " Harter , Assessing tlz e Assessors. supra note 5, a t 51. I a lready 
described these sett lement nego tia tions and reported th at this chall enge was 
ultim ately withdrawn. Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1304-
1305, 1307 n.246. 
1 8 -'~ !d. at 1308. 
IS5 Jd . 
186 Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships , sup ra no te 182, a t 756 
(parentheticals omitted) , cited in Coglianese, Asssessing Consensus, supra note 
2, at 1308 n.247. 
187 See Clean A ir Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607( b) (1994) (60-day period); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1994) (120-day period); R eso urce Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, 42 U .S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (1994) (90-day period); Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U .S.C. § 300j- 7 (1994) (45-day period) ; Surface Mining 
Control and R eclamation A ct, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (1 ) (1994) (60-d ay pe ri od); 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(1) (1994) (60-day period). 
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E PA rul es, the petition simply signals the beginning of a new 
round of working out the details of the rule with the agency. In-
dustry and environme ntal groups frequently treat litigation as a 
continuation of the rulemaking process, albe it with a smaller 
number of parti cipants.1ss 
Thus when Harter suggests tha t nego tia ted rulemaking has 
spared E PA highly protracted litigation because many of the 
chailenges to these rules were eventually withdrawn, he is actu-
all y describing the normal pattern of challenges to E PA . As I 
report in A ssessing Consensus: 
For a ll cha ll e nges to E PA rules fil ed in th e D.C. C ircui t be -
tween 1979-1 990, o nly 29 % we re resolved thro ugh adjud ica-
tio n be fore a n ap pe lla te pa ne l. Negoti at ion and se ttl e me nt 
di scuss ions typicaily foll ow th e filin g of chall e nges to any EPA 
rul e . . . . In th e aggregate, negotiated rule ma kin g has no t ge n-
e rated any substantial difference in the way tha t legal cha l-
lenges ge t reso lved .1S9 
Indeed , the litiga tion against negotiated rules turns o ut to be vir-
t ually the same as litigation against co nventional rules along 
every dimension, except that negotia ted rules are cha llenged at a 
higher rate .190 A single rule can , of co urse , be challenged by 
more than one organization. The data re veal not only that nego-
tiated rules are challenged at a higher ra te , but a lso that each 
challenge involves on average a somewhat larger number of pe ti-
tione rs. As Ta ble 2 shows, the average number of pe titi o ns fil ed 
against negotiated rules is actually somewhat higher than the av-
erage number of petitions in challenges to conventional rules 
overall (3.7 petitions per challenged negotiated rul e versus 3.0 
for challenged conventio nal rules). 19 1 The rate at which these 
challenges eventually reach a court fo r decision is abo ut the same 
as for challe nges to conventional rules , and courts have been 
equally deferential in adjudicated challenges to negotiat ed rules 
as they are mo re generally in all challenges to E PA r ules . 192 The 
typica l challenge fil ed against an E PA negoti ated rule does not 
differ in any discernible way from the typical cha ll enge fil ed 
against a conventional rule . 
1ss Coglianese, L itigaring vVirhin R elationships , supra no te 182, at 757-58. 
189 Cogli anese, Assessing Consensus , supra note 2, at 1308. 
190 See infi"a tb1.2. 
191 Coglianese , Assessing Consensus, supra note 2. at 1310 n .252 . 
1Y2 Jd. 
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T AB L-E 2: 
L ITIGATION CHALLENGING EPA RULE MAK!NGS 
Pe rce ntage of Ru les C hall e nge d 
Numbe r of Pe titi o ns Filed Pe r 
C hallen ge 
Perce nt<l ge of Fil ed Pe titi ons 
Dec id ed bv Cour t 
Pe rce ntage o f Adjudicated Cases 
Decided for EPA 





" Cugli ancsc . / \ sscssing Consensus. supra note 2. a t !300. 
I· f c/. 
' M ~lt 1310 n. 2:52. 
d /d. 
' !J at LJO;) n. 247. 
' !d. a t lJOS. 
s !d. at 1300-lJOl) n . .249. 
h /d. 
Nego tia ted 
Rulemaking 
50 'Yo b 
3.7d 
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C. Negotiated Rulemaking Engenders AdditionaL Conf lict 
Not only does negotiated rulemaking fail to e liminate litiga-
tio n or reduce its intensity, it also results in more legal challe nges 
than would otherwise be expected. These legal challenges have 
bee n filed both by participants in negotiated rulemakings and by 
organizations who were not part of the negotiation process .193 
As I explain in Assessing Consensus , the failure of negotiated 
rulemaking to live up to expectations is in part expl ained by the 
fact that conventional rulemaking at EPA has been much more 
resis tant to litiga tion than anyone previously believed. 194 It is 
also the case that negotiation efforts do not resolve all conflicts. 
and, in some ways, they can even engender new conflicts. As we 
have seen. consensus is not always attainable, and even when it 
is , it may only temporarily hide underlying conflictsYY' Negoti-
ated rulemaking also creates new sources of conflict that do not 
exist with other methods of policy making. 196 Conflicts can arise 
over the selection of participants in the negotiations, the meaning 
of agreements that are reached, and whether the final rule is con-
t9 .~ See id. at 1302. 
t 94 !d. at 1330-34. 
i95 See supra Part II.A. See also Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra 
note 2. at 1290-94 (describ ing confl icts unde rlying challenges to the re formu -
lated gasoline rule ). 
196 See Coglianese. Is Consensus Appropriate?, supra note 2. at 112-1 3. 
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sistent with those agreements. 197 Disagreements can even arise 
about the implications of silence in the agreement over particular 
terms or issues .1 98 None of these additional kinds of conflict 
arise in the absence of negotiated rulemaking. 
A recent negotiated rulemaking effort at the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) illustrates one of these 
new sources of conflict. HUD had originally named four public 
housing organizations to serve on negotiated rulemaking com-
mittees for regulations addressing subsidies and capital funds. 199 
After the housing organiza tions subsequently filed a petition 
against the agency over a separate matter, HUD officials unil at-
erally declared that the organizations could no longer bargain 
with the agency in good faith and removed them from the negoti-
ated rulemaking committees.2 00 The housing groups filed for a 
court order reversing their removal from the committee, arguing 
that BUD's action discriminated against them in the exercise of 
their fundamental right of petition.2 01 HUD eventually capitu-
lated and reinstated the organizations as members of the negoti-
ated rulemaking committees, but the experience demonstrates a 
profound new source of litigated conflict that, ironically, is found 
only in the very process that was intended to reduce litigation. 
IV 
NEGOTIATED RuLEMAKING 's PROMISE 
R EMA INS U N FULFILLED 
Harter concludes his critique by downplaying the impor-
tance of determining whether negotiated rulemaking reduces the 
incidence of litigation or shortens the duration of the process: 
He argues that the primary objective of negotiated rulemaking is 
to create better regulatory policy and that it has achieved that 
1~7 For cxa1nples o f the range of conflicts engend ered by negotiated rulem ak-
ing agree ments. see Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2 , at 1322-27. 
19~ !d. 
199 Not ice of Intent to E stabli sh a Negotiated Rulemaking Committee , 64 
Fed. R eg. 5570, 5571 (Feb. 3, 1999); Establishment of Negotiated Rul emaking 
Committee , 64 Fed . R eg. 12,920, 12,921 (Mar. 16, 1999). 
200 HUD Tells PHA Organizations They Shouldn't Participate on Negotiated 
Rulemaking Commitrees, [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep . (West), 
757-58 (April 5, 1999). 
201 Mo tion for Temporary Restraining Order, Council of Large Pub. H o us. 
Auths. , Inc. v. U.S. Dep ' t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (D.D.C. Mar. 25. 1999) (No. 
1 :99CV00634) . 
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goal.2°2 According to Harter, negotiated rulemaking has proved 
to be "an enormously powerful tool" for developing better 
rules .203 He claims that negoti a ted rulemaking "has enabled the 
parties to address the best, most effective, or most efficient way 
of solving a regulatory controversy. "204 These benefits , he ar-
gues , "flow[] from the participation of those affected , who bring 
with them a practical insight and expertise that can result in rules 
that are be tter informed, more tailored to achieving the actual 
regulatory goal , and hence, more effective and more 
enforceable. "20:; 
Harter claims that the fi ndings of the study by Laura 
Langbein and Ne il Kerwin provide "particularly powerful" sup-
port for his claim that negotiated rulemaking improves the qual-
ity of regul atory decisions. 206 That study reports that participants 
in negotiated rulemakings perceive the resulting final rules more 
favorably than do those who file comments in conventional 
rulemakings. 207 Once again, however, Harter engages in faulty 
empirical analysis and uses it in an effort to bolster support for 
negotiated rulemaking. The Langbein and Kerwin study actually 
provides no basis for drawing inferences about the quality of ne-
gotiated rules.208 Furthermore , Harter disregards the problems 
that negotiated rulemaking can create and overlooks alternative 
methods of public participation that can provide agencies with 
the same " practical insight and expertise, "209 and other alleged 
benefits of negoti ated rulemaking, all without relying on consen-
sus as the basis for public policy . In the absence of demonstrable 
improvements in regulatory decisions , negotiated rulemaking's 
failure to shorten the rulemaking process or reduce litigation will 
remain a relevant and important consideration in evaluating the 
role of formal negotiations in administrative law. 
202 Harte r, Assessing rh e Assessors, supra note 5, at 52. Freem an a nd 
Langbein echo Harte r , arguing that " time and litigatio n rates te ll only part of 
th e story and although relevant , they remain secondary to improved rule qual-
ity and legitimacy. ·· F reeman & Langbein, sup ra no te 133, at 128. 
203 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 56. 
204 Id. at 38. 
205 Id. at 54. Although H arter 's rhetoric m ay sound a bit exaggerated , he is 
not alone among advoca tes in so unding such an enthusias tic refrain. See, e.g., 
Fox, supra no te 155. 
206 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 56. 
207 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 602-605. 
208 See inf ra Part IV.A. 
209 See supra note 205. 
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A. Langbein and Kerwin's Study Does Not Address rhe 
Quality of Rules 
Laura Langbein and Cornelius Kerwin interviewed 101 par-
ticipants in eight EPA negotiated rulemakings and fifty-one ran-
domly selected individuals who had submitted comments in six 
conventional rulemakings conducted by EPA. 2 10 T11ey asked 
both sets of respondents a series of questions about their experi-
ence with the rulemaking in which they were involved and about 
their perceptions of the process and resulting rule. 211 Using an 
eleven-point scale (from -5 to +5), participants were asked to rate 
the final rules on a number of criteria, including the economic 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the final rule, the quality of 
the scientific evidence used to create the final rule, and the ap-
propriateness of the final rule's use of technology. 212 Langbein 
and Kerwin found that the differences between the responses of 
participants in negotiated and conventional rulemakings were in 
many cases statistically significant and resulted in more positive 
average ratings by the participants in negotiated rulemakings. 213 
Harter makes much of these differences, even to the point of in-
cluding Langbein and Kerwin's data in a table in his article, and 
urges that they demonstrate that negotiated rulemaking does 
achieve better rules.214 The Langbein and Kerwin study, he ar-
gues, shows that '' [t]he benefits envisioned by the proponents of 
negotiated rulemaking have indeed been realized. "21 5 
Yet the study conducted by Langbein and Kerwin does not 
demonstrate that such benefits have been realized. The data 
they report are at best evidence of the perceptions of partici-
pants, not evidence of the underlying qualities that would make 
for a better rule, such as efficiency or effectiveness. As Langbein 
and Freeman state in their recent discussion of the Langbein and 
Kerwin study, "[a]s to whether reg neg produces 'better rules' in 
some objective sense, we cannot say.''210 
Before explaining why this is so, two other limitations of the 
Langbein and Kerwin data should be noted. First, the types of 
respondents in the negotiated rulemaking sample differ consider-
2 1o Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89. at 601. 
m !d. at 600-602. 
m !d. at 603-604. 
m !d. at 604 exhib.l. 
214 See Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 55-56, 59 tbl.3. 
215 !d. at 56. 
216 Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 66. 
r 
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ably from the types of respondents in the conventional rulemak-
ing sample. Langbein and Kerwin report that of all the types of 
participants in negotiated rulemakings, the representatives from 
EPA and state government gave negotiated rulemaking the high-
est overall ratings. 2 17 This is important to recognize because ap-
proximately eleven percent of the negotiated rulemaking 
participants they inte rviewed were EPA officials and approxi-
mately twenty-five percent were representatives from state and 
local government. 2 10 In contrast, the sample of individuals who 
filed comments in conve ntional rulemakings obviously included 
no one from EPA 2 19 and included only three representatives 
from state and local government. 220 Thus, approximately thirty-
six percent of the respondents from negoti a ted rulemakings were 
individuals who might be considered "enthusiasts ," given their 
higher overall ratings, while only approximately six percent of 
the comparison group were .22 1 'We should not be surprised , of 
course, if government regulators tend to rate government regula-
tions, whether negotiated or otherwise , more favorably than 
those whom the regulations affect. 222 In addition, we should also 
not be surprised if those who help to craft a negotiated rule re-
port more favorable ratings than those who file comments on a 
proposed rule, since presumably people tend to file comments 
when they have complaints they wish to air. Notably, only 
217 Cornelius M. Kerwin & Laura I. Langbein , An Evaluation of Negotia ted 
Rule making at the E nviro nme ntal Protection A gency: Phase IT, A Compari son 
o f Conventional and Negoti a ted Rulernaking 45 tbl.46 (August 1997) [here inaf-
ter Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II] (unpublished report prepared for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, on file with N.Y. U. Environmental Law Journal): 
see also Freeman & Lan gbein, supra note 133, at 61 n.5. 
2 1t> Kerwin & Langbein , Phase II. supra not e 217 . a t 45 tbl.l. 
21\1 Langbein & Ke rwin. supra note 89, at 620. The fact that EPA offi ci::il s 
wo uld never be included in a sampl e derived fro m commente rs is so obvious 
th a t it is remarkabl e to find Langbein and Freeman now claiming that "parti ci-
pants, including EPA , ra te th e o utcomes of negotiated rul es as better than th e 
o utcomes from conve nti ona l rulemaking. '' Free man & Langbein, supra note 
133, at 66 (emphasis add ed). We cannot infer anything a t all about how E PA 
offici a ls compare negoti a ted and conventional rul e making from a study th a t 
o nly asks their views of nego tiated rulcmaking. It m ay be re levant, however, to 
co nsider that EPA has no t co mmenced a new nego tia ted rulemaking proceed-
ing since 1993. 
220 Kerwin & Langbein , Phase lL supra note 217 , a t 45 tbl.l. 
221 ld. 
n2 Cf. WEtss, supra note 33, a t 147 (noting tha t " [h]mvever objective th ey 
may be, staff members can be suspected of bias- oft en justl y- in the directi o n of 
see in g improvement wh ere non e exists" ). 
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twenty-four percent of the negotiated rulemaking respondents 
came from business, compared with sixty-seven percent of the 
respondents in the conventional rulemaking sample . . The differ-
ences in the average ratings reported by Langbein and Kenvin, 
and relied on by Harter, seem likely to reflect these differences 
in the makeup of the sam ples.223 
Second, although Langbein and Kerwin claim their data re-
veal that participants in negotiated rul emakings have a "higher 
level of satisfaction with the final rule,'' 22-+ one of the negotiated 
rulemakings in their study-the haza rdous waste manifest 
223 Langbein and Kerwin purport to control for the affiliation of their respo n-
dents in their regression analysis. See Langebein & Ke rwin , sup ra no te 89, at 
623-24. However, their mode l fails to provide a sufficient basis for ruling o ut 
the e ffects of responde nts' affiliation on the res ults th at H arter cites. First , 
Langbein and Kerwin only repo rt having a tte mpted to control for the e ffects of 
affilia tions on respond ents ' overall ratings of the rul e making process, not on the 
specific ratings of the substantive qualities o f th e rules (such as efficiency and 
quality). Second, even with respect to the ratings for overall process, Langbein 
and Kerwin fail to control meaningfully fo r the e ffects o f respondents' affilia-
tion s. They control for the ratin gs provided by responde nts from different affil-
iations (e.g. business or environmental groups) relative to the ra tings provided 
by respondents from EPA. See id. at 622-23 exhibs.8&9. While ordinarily this 
would be fine, using EPA as the reference group in this case is problematic 
because Langbein and Kerwin have absolutely no EPA respondents in their 
con ventional rulemaking sample. H ence . the most that could possibly be said is 
that Langbein and Kerwin have tested for how respondents from othe r affilia-
tions, such as business an d environmental gro ups, rate the process of both con-
venriona / and negotiated rules compared with the ratings EPA offici als give just 
to negoriared rules. To rule out the effects of affili a tion using the approach they 
take, Langbein and Kerwin would have needed to compare the ratings of non-
EPA resp ondents in both types of rulemakings, with the ratings of EPA respon-
dents in both types of rulemakings. As it stands , interpre ting the results for the 
affiliation variables in Langbein and Kerwin 's statistical mode l is a lot like try-
ing to compare apples and oranges. In statistical terms, the excluded dummy 
variable in their model ("EPA") is essentia lly a n interaction term, as all the 
ratings provided by EPA are interacting with th e independent variable of inter-
est (" reg neg"). The excluded dummy vari able is effectively a t work only for 
negotiated rules, not for conventiona l rul es. Based on the available analysis 
provided by Langbein and Kerwin , it is th erefore not possible to rul e out the 
likelihood that the higher average rat ings for negotiated rules that Harter 
points to are at least partly a function of the substantial differences in the affi li-
ations of the respondents making up the two samples . 
224 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 603. Langbe in and Kerwin use the 
term "fin al rule" numerous times in their study to describe their data, even 
using it in their section heading on "Satisfaction with the Overall Process and 
the Final Rule. " !d. at 602. L angbein and Freeman similarly sta te tha t "par tici-
pants in negoti ated rul emakin gs expressed greater sati sfaction with the final 
rule than participants in conventional rulemakings. " Freeman & Langbein, 
supra note 133 , at 110. 
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rulemaking-had not resulted in a final rule at the time of their 
interviews. 225 This is significant because nineteen respondents in 
their study came from this one rulemaking, more than from any 
other rulemaking in their study except the reformulated gasoline 
rulemaking which had twenty respondents.226 As a result, nearly 
twenty percent of the negotiated rulemaking respondents 
(nineteen out of 101)227 in the Langbein and Kerwin study could 
not express any meaningful satisfaction with the "eventual out-
come (i.e., the final rule)" because EPA had simply not ye t issued 
any final rule on hazardous waste manifests. 228 Langbein and 
Kerwin nevertheless included responses from the participants in 
the hazardous waste manifest negotiations in their analysis. 229 
Putting these concerns to the side, it is conceivable that an 
~ . 
appropriate comparison of participant perceptions of final rules 
might still result in higher average ratings for negotiated rules 
than for conventional rules. However, even if this were so, it 
would not provide "powerful" support as Harter suggests,230 for 
his belief that negotiated rulemaking leads to better rules. On 
the contrary , it would provide no reliable evidence at all for the 
underlying quality of the rules. To see why, consider Langbein 
and Kerwin's findings with respect to litigation. They asked their 
respondents to rate the likelihood that the rules for which they 
were involved in the rulemaking process would resist legal chal-
lenge. The average rating for negotiated rules (3.3) turned out to 
be significantly higher than the average rating given for conven-
225 Langbein & Kerwin , supra note 89, at 629. According to Langbein and 
Kerwin, all of the other rules in the ir study had resulted in a final rule at the 
tim e of the interviews. Td. at 600. 
226 Kerwin & Langbein, Phase I , supra note 39, at 6. 
227 !d. 
22::: Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89. at 603. Kerwin boas ts th a t his study 
with Langbein provides " the most compelling evidence to elate ... that negoti-
ated rulemaking produces ... results superior to conventional rule making." 
CoRN ELIUS M. KERWI N , RuLE MAKTNG: H o w G ovER NrviENT AG ENCI ES WRITE 
LAw AND MAKE PoucY 182 (2cl eel. 1999) (emph asis added) [h ereinafter K ER-
WI N 2cl]. Yet the results had ye t to come in for about twenty perce nt of his 
respondents in that study. 
229 The number of responses included in the average ratings reported by 
Langbein and Kerwin range from ninety-five to ninety-nine for most of the cri-
teria that they surveyed, indicating that they must have included responses from 
the interviews with the nineteen participants from the hazardous waste manifest 
rule. See Langbein & Kerwin , supra note 89, at 604 exhib.l. 
nu See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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tiona! rules (1.9). 23 1 Of course, this does not m ean that negoti-
ated rules really are more resistant to legal challenge. As we 
have seen, the evidence from court filings shows otherwise: nego-
tiated rules are challenged at a higher rate than conventional 
rules. :n::: Along ot her dimensions, such as the average number of 
petitions filed and the rate of settlement , negotia ted rul emaking 
exhibits no grea ter degree of resistance to litiga ti on. 233 It is pre-
cisely this kind of data, not data on participants' perceptions, that 
is needed to make judgments about the actual res istance of nego-
tiated rules to legal challenge . Appropriately, Langbein and Ker-
win acknowledge as much. 234 Nowhere in tb e ir published art icle 
do they discuss the statistically significant and more favorable 
rating respondents give negotiated rules for their resi stance to 
legal cha llenge.235 Instead, they make a limi ted effort to report 
the act ual litigation rates for the rules included in their study. 236 
1l1ey admit "the limitations of the approach [they] used to deter-
mine the occurrence and outcomes of litigation. "237 At best, they 
claim that " although our data are not as comprehensive as Cog-
lianese's, our evidence is consistent with hi s. ''238 
If participants in negotiated rulemakings tend to rate the re-
sulting rules more favorably when it comes to litiga tion, they cer-
2:; 1 La ngbein & Kerwin. supra note 89 , at 604 exhib.l. The ratin gs a rc o n an 
11-point scale , with a " 5'' indicating that the res ponde nt believed th e rule had 
the most resistance to legal challenge possible and a .. _5' ' indicating a be li ef that 
the rul e had the leas t resistance possible. 
232 See supra tbl.2. 
233 ld. 
234 Kerwin descr ibes his study with Langbe in as dealing with the iss ue of liti-
gation "in only cursory fashion ." KERWI N 2cl, supra note 228, at 182 . 
235 ln Table 3 of his article , Harter excerpts th e ave rage ratings give n fo r 
resistance to lit iga ti o n in the Langbein and Kerwin study. but. like Langbein 
and Kerwin, he m akes no mention o f them in th e text of hi s ar ticl e. La ngbein & 
Kerwin , supra no te 89 , at 604 exhib.l, cited in Harter, Assessing the Assessors, 
supra note 5, at 59 tbl.3. 
236 Langbein & Kerwin. supra note 89, at 614. Rath e r than consult court 
records. Langbein and Kerwin re ly o n info rm at ion provided by ACUS o n some 
o f the challenges fil ed against negotiated rules and on simp ly asking the ir nego-
ti ated and conventional rulem aking respon de nts if th ey knevv whethe r the rule 
in which they were in volved had been chall enge d. !d. In the many inte rvi ews I 
have conducted with interest gro up lawyers and regula to ry s taff, I have often 
not iced that otherwise knowledgeable policy insiders do not a lways know about 
liti gation chall enging EPA rules, even for th e rulemakings in which th ey have 
been involved. 
237 !d. 
238 !d . 
r 
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tainly may do so when it comes to other qualities of rules .Lw 
Participants' p erceptions of certain aspects of a final rule do not 
necessarily match reality. In fact , there are at leas t three well-
accepted psychological explanations for why participants' per-
ce ptions would tend to be more favorable toward nego tiated 
rulemakings , none of which have a nything to do with the under-
lying quality of the rules. Cognitive dissonance . the Hawthorne 
effect. and procedural justice theory all can lead one to expect 
that responde nts would give higher ratings to negotiated 
rulemaking. 
Social psychologists have for many years told us that individ-
uals adjust thei r views to avoid dissonance because the existence 
of incompatible or dissonant cognitions is psychologically un-
comfo rtable.240 On e paradigmatic kind of cognitive dissonance . 
the so-called ''effort justification paradigm," occurs as individu als 
respond to the effort needed to achieve an outcome .241 ll1e 
more effort an individual must expend at some task , and the 
more unpleasant that effort, more dissonance is generatecl. 242 In-
dividuals who find themselves in such situations reduce disso-
nance " by exaggerating the desirability of the outcome. '' 243 In 
the classic study demonstrating this effect, women were asked to 
under take either a severe or a mild rite of "initiation " to join a 
discussion group.244 Although the discussion group was equally 
boring in eithe r case , the women who were assigned to undert ake 
the more severe initiation evaluated the group more favorably 
than did the women who went through the mild initiation.245 As 
E lliot Aronson has explained, "going through hell and high water 
to gain admission to a boring discussion group was dissonant with 
239 In deed. if Langbein and Kerwin 's analysis of litigat ion is "cursory.'' as 
Ke rwin has acknowleclgcc!, see KERWIN 2cl, supra note 228, at 182, it is hard to 
sec how the appl ication of the sa me research methods to other criteria could 
provide "'t he most compelling evidence to date that negoti a ted rulemaking pro-
duces. on many fronts, results superior to conventi onal rul ema king,' ' as Kerwin 
has claimed. !d . 
2-1u See LeoN FESTI NGER, A TH EORY OF CoGN ITI VE DISSONANCE 2-3 (1957). 
2-ll Edd ie H armon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction ro Cognirive Disso-
nance Tlzeor_v and an Overvinv of Current Per:,pectives on rhe Theory , in CocN I -
TIVE Di ssoN ;\ NCE: PRoGREss oN A Pi vOTAL THEORY IN Soc i AL P sYCHOLOGY 
3, 8 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eels ., 1999). 
242 fd. at 7. 
24.' !d. 
2-1 4 Elli ot Aronson & Judson Mi lls, Th e Effect of Severiry of lniriarion on Lik-
ing foro Group. 59 J. ABNORi'viAL & Soc. P s YCH. 177 (1 959) . 
2-15 !d. at 180-81. 
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one's self-concept as a smart and reasonable person, who makes 
smart and reasonable decisions. "246 
Negotiated rulemaking is similarly an effort-intensive form 
of rulemaking. Since participants in negotiated rulemaking ex-
pend more effort (and complain more of the need to expend 
more effort) ,24 7 we can expect that they will reduce th eir disso-
nance by viewing the outcome of this intensive process more fa-
vorably. What is striking from the Langbein and Kerwin study is 
that they find no statistica lly significant differences between the 
responses from the negotiated and the conventional rulemaking 
samples with regard to perceived net benefits from parti cipation 
in th e rulemaking process.248 The overwhelming majority of re-
spondents in both groups found that the benefits they realized 
from their participation equaled or exceeded the costs.249 When 
the costs of participating in negotiated rulemaking are so much 
higher, individuals can be expected to exaggerate the desirable 
qualities of the outcome of the rulemaking process , holding this 
net satisfaction level constant and avoiding cognitive dissonance. 
A second explanation for higher ratings by negotiated 
rulemaking participants may be found in the so-called Haw-
thorne effect. This effect , named for the factory in which it was 
first documented, refers to the artificial boost that occurs from 
the mere participation in an experiment or study.2 50 R esearchers 
investigating the effects of changes in working conditions on pro-
ductivity found that , over a period of more than two years , the 
productivity of the experimental group always rose-regardless 
of the changes made to the work schedule , lighting, methods of 
pay, and other conditions under study.25 1 The workers in the ex-
perimental group outperformed everyone else due to the high 
leve l of morale they associated with being in an experiment and 
because they knew they were being observed.2 52 Anyo ne who 
studies the perceptions of participants in negotiated rulemaking 
must be mindful that the H awthorne effect may play a role be-
246 E lli o t A ronson, Dissonance, Hyp ocrisy, and th e Self-Co n cepr, in CocNI-
TI VE DISSONANCE, supra note 241, at 103, 112. 
2~7 See supra no te 139 and accompanying text. 
248 Kerwin & Langbein , supra no te 217, a t 26, 45 tb l.38. 
249 Jd . 
250 See F.J. R oethlisberger & William J . Dickson, M a nagement and the 
Worker (1939) . 
25 1 See id. at 75-89. 
252 See id. at 85- 86, 179-86. 
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cause negotiated rulemaking is a novelty in the administrative 
process and has often been treated as an experiment.253 Those 
serving on a negotiated rulemaking may 'Nell be boosted in their 
morale or satisfaction just from knowing that they are participat-
ing in a special, experimental regulatory process. Philip Harter 
has himself ea rli er acknowledged that the Hawthorne effect can 
arise in cases of negotiated rulemaking.254 
A final possible explanation for more favorable perceptions 
of negotiated rul es stems from th e work of social psychologist 
Tom Tyler and others on procedural justice.255 The procedural 
justice literature supports the claim that how people value pro-
cess independently of how they value outcomes.256 Langbein 
and her coauthors favor this theory, arguing that negotiated 
rulemaking fosters increased satisfaction, or a "warm glovv," be-
cause participants are treated with respect and have a greater op-
portunity to provide their input.257 Of course, as already 
suggested , such a ··warm glow" may also come in this case from 
cognitive dissonance, or perhaps from the Hawthorne effect, 
rather than from considerations of procedural justice. Indeed, it 
may well be that cognitive dissonance or the Hawthorne effect 
provide the better explanation , if for no other reason than that it 
is hard to see why negotiated rulemaking should be viewed as 
more procedurally legitimate than a fulL open rulemaking pro-
cess. Langbein and Kerwin never asked their respondents to rate 
the fairness of the rulemaking processes in which they partici-
pated,258 although they did ask them to rate the extent to which 
253 See, e.g., USA Gro up Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 
1996) (describing negot iated rulemaking as a ' 'novelty in th e administrative 
process"). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
254 Philip J. H arter , EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Will Provide O pportunity 
fo r Direct Parricipation in Developm em of a Regulation , 13 En vt l. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,202. 10.203 (July 1983) (noting th e potential for " the intru-
sion of the Hawthorne effect" in negotiated rul emaking) . 
255 See, e. g., E. ALLAN Lt ND & T oM R. TYLER , TH E SociAL PsYCHOLOGY oF 
P ROCED URAL JU STI CE (1988). 
256 See id. at 66-70. 
257 Langbein & Kerwin , supra note 89, at 626 (arguing th at participants "care 
about how the authorities who make and implement rules and policies treat 
th em (and others)"). See also Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133. at 67 (as-
serting th at "the data suggest that the legi timacy benefit turns, to a significant 
extent on participation in a process, specificall y one that presents an opportu-
nity to affect the outcome"). 
258 Langbein & Kerwin , supra note 89, at 626 (noting that "we did not ask 
respondents explicitly to rate the fairness of th e rule-making process in which 
th ey participated"). 
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public participation affected agency policy.25 lJ As they write in 
thei r Phase II report , "in both cases [of negoti ated and conven-
tional rulemaking], public participation is viewed as open , unbi-
ased, and int1uential. The two rulemaking processes are seen as 
equally receptive and responsive to public involvement."260 If 
Langbein and Kerwin are correct that these two processes are 
equaliy responsive,26 1 then it would seem that researchers should 
look beyond procedural just ice theory for an explanation of the 
''warm glow" allegedly fostered by negotia ted rulemaking. 
No matter which of these three theories best explains the 
more favorable ratings that participants might give to their ex-
periences with negotiated rulemaking, the main point is that such 
perceptions do not provide a sound basis for drawi ng any infer-
ences about the underlying effi cacy and efficiency o f regulations. 
Harter is simply wrong to claim that the results of the L angbein 
and Kerwin study show that negotiated rulemaking has suc-
ceeded in achieving better rules. Hi2 
B. A lternative Fonns of Rulemaking Offer Sirnilar Advantages 
Without the Disadvantages of Decision i'vlaking 
by Consensus 
Harter not only misinterprets and overstates the results of 
the Langbein and Kerwin study, he also understates the 
problems engendered by negotiated rulemaking and the effec-
tiveness of alternative forms of public participation in the 
rulemaking process. As a form of advocacy, it m ay be under-
standable for Harter to downplay the problems associated with 
negotiated rulemaking and to disregard the advantages of its al-
ternatives. However, a complete assessment of negotiated 
rul emaking needs to take into account both advantages and di s-
advantages , and then to compare these against the performance 
of alt ernative forms of public part icipation in the regulatory 
process. 
A lthough Harter does not acknowledge any problems with 
negotiated rulemaking, consensus-based processes actually pre-
sent several potential limitations on the development of sound 
25LJ Jd. at 612. 
2GIJ Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II , supra not e 217. at 23-24. 
~ 61 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 613-14 (not ing th a t "the agency is 
equally responsive to o utside pressures in both rul e making processes"'). 
262 Hmtcr. Assessing the A ssessors, supra note 5. at 56. 
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public policy.263 As explained earlier , negoti a ted rulemaking de-
mands additional time and contributes new sources of conflict to 
the policy process.264 But the potential hazards of poiicy making 
by consensus run still deeper. 
By emphasizing the attainment of conse nsus. negotiated 
rul emaking tends to lead agencies to focus on more tractable is-
sues, rather than the most important problems or those most de-
serving of additional time and effo rt. That agencies se lect rules 
based on tractability is evident in, if nothing e lse . the paucity of 
rul es that agencies have developed through negotia ted rulemak-
ing.265 Proponents of negotiated rulemaking have never claimed 
that consensus building would be appropriate fo r much more 
than about five to ten percent of all agency rulemakings,2h6 and 
in practice the use of the procedure has been st ill more rare. 267 
Age ncies have eschewed negotiated rulemaking fo r federal rules 
having the broadest and most substantial impacts on industry and 
the public.261> 
A n emphasis on consensus can lead not only to the selection 
a t the outset of the more tractable policy issues for negotiation, 
but also to the selection of the more tractable issues within the 
negotiat ions themselves, even though these may not necessarily 
be the issues that are most important to the public. The fact that 
the negotiated rulemaking committee is charged with achieving 
consensus may inhibit some participants from raising important 
issues for fear of hindering the achievement of an agreement. In 
263 For a more extensive discussion of the problems assoc iated with deci sion 
making by consensus. see Cogli anese . Is Consensus Appropriate? . supra note 2, 
at 106-13. 
26.J See supra Parts II. Ill. 
2(1 5 See supra note 27 and accompa nying text. 
2i>1> See, e.g., Susskind & Van Dam, supra note l , at 44 ( indi ca ting that negoti-
<Hecl r ul emaking "could be used to develop as much as ten percent of all rul es"): 
Milier. supra note 1. at 21 (quoting EPA's Christopher Kirtz as stating that 
··between 5% and 10% of ou r regul ations lend th emse lves to th e technique of 
negot iated rulemaking"). 
207 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1277 (less than one-
tent h of one percent of all federal rules have been pro mulgated following a 
negotiated rulcmaking proceeding). 
26::> Id . at 1318 (noting th at "the EPA rules that affec t the broadest number of 
organizatio ns have never been se lec ted for negotia ted rulemaking") . Only five 
negotiated rulcrnakings have been classified as "major" or "significant " rules 
for having economic effects o f $100 million or more annu ally. !d. at 1314 n.266. 
Moreover. the Negotiated Rulemaking Act sets forth principles that agencies 
arc supposed to use in selecting rules for negoti a ti o n, most of which place a 
premium on tractability rather th an on policy importance. hi. at 1319-20. 
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this way, a quest for consensus may exacerbate the tendency for 
''groupthink " to take hold.269 In the equipment leaks negotiated 
rulemaking, for example, an EPA official knew indu~try was 
overlooking issues related to an entire category of equipment in 
developing the rule , but never said a word about it during the 
negotiations. 270 Only later, in the subsequent litiga tion over the 
rule , did the industry group raise the issue of coverage of the 
neglected equipment.27 1 In many circumstances decision makers 
need contlict to help illuminate policy issues. The full articula-
tion of opposing views, even structured in an adversarial process, 
may yield more useful information on which to construct public 
policy than a truncated discussion between individuals who are 
striving to achieve consensus.272 
In addition to giving priority to tractable issues. negotiated 
rul emaking may encourage imprecision or ambiguity. 273 Since it 
is usually eas ier to achieve consensus at higher levels of abstrac-
tion , the potential always exists that negotiators will adopt ab-
stract or vague language.274 As Neil Kerwin has observed, when 
an agency commits itself to obtaining consensus, that is , "to pro-
269 When po licy decisions are based on consensus some participants " may 
refrain from voicing their concerns, either by se lf-discipline and a desire not to 
shatter gro up harmon y (suppression of doubts) or fo ll owing direct hints by th e 
leader (co mpliance) or by fellow group me mbers (mindguards; p eer press ure). 
When consensus is no longer required , group discussion can be more open.'' 
PAuL ' T HART, GRoUPTHI NK IN GovERN~J!ENT: A STuDY or SMA.L L GRouPs 
AND POLICY f AlL URE 293 (1994). 
270 See Coglianese , Assessing Consensus, supra no te 2, at 1307-1308 n.246. 
271 !d. at 1305. 
272 Cf. RoGER B. PoRTER, PR ESID ENTIAL DEciSION M AK ING: THE Eco-
NOM IC Po u cY BoARD 21-29 (1980) (describing the advantages o f a "multiple 
advocacy" mod el of decision m aking, whereby pres idential advisors are en-
co uraged to put forw ard competing positions as a means to achieve bet te r in-
formed policy). 
273 See, e.g., JANE M ANSB RIDGE, B EYOND ADVERSARY DEMOC RA CY 167 
(1980) . In he r s tud y o f democra tic decision making, Jane Mansbridge found 
tha t "[ c ]onsensual decision making also generates imprecision. In ord er to 
reach unanimo us agreement, groups formulate the ir co ll ective decisio n so as to 
blur potential disagreements." !d. This was demonstrated most clearly in re-
cent years wh en form er EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus convened a 
se t of negotiations be tween industry, government, and the environmenta l com-
munity to forge a consensus about how to improve environmental policy in the 
United States. The resulting agreement consisted largely of vague statements 
and pla titudes. See Cary Coglianese, Th e Limits of Consensus, E NVIRO NMENT, 
Apr. 1999, at 28. 
274 See Colin Diver , The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65, 75 (1 983) . 
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clueing a rule with which everyone with a recognized interest can 
agree , the only way to break certain deadlocks is to produce a 
rule that ignores unresolved (or unresolvable) issues or deal s 
with them through vague language whose meaning will be dis-
pu ted during the implementation process. "275 Adopting vague 
language may serve to secure agreement for its own sake, but 
doing so can constrain the effectiveness of any resulting public 
policy. 
Nego tiated rulemaking's emphasis on unanimity also makes 
it more likely that the final outcome will succumb to the lowes t-
common-denominator problem. The outcome that is minimally 
acceptable to all the members of a negotiated rulemaking com-
mittee will not necessarily be optimal or effective in terms of 
achievi ng social goals. A recent study of negoti ated rulemaking 
conducted by Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford shows that 
in industries that are not likely to innovate in the absence of 
strong governmental regulation, the lowest-common-denomina-
tor problem keeps negotiated rules from promoting the techno-
logical innovation needed to improve environmental and safety 
performance. 276 They conclude that because industry represent-
atives in these types of industries will be reluctant to agree to 
regulations that would compel firms to make dramatic invest-
ments in new technologies, "negotiated rulemaking's focus on 
consensus can effectively remove the potential to spur 
innovation. "277 
A lthough these problems do not necessarily arise in every 
negotiated rulemaking, and some can surely occur even in certain 
conventional rulemakings, a complete assessment of negotiated 
rulemaking needs to take these potential hazards into account. 
The incentives created by a search for consensus tend to make 
these problems particularly more acute in regulatory negotia -
tions. fv'lo reover, a complete assessment of negotiated rulemak-
ing and the quality of regulatory policy must compare negotiated 
rulemaking with alternative forms of policy deliberation that do 
not aim for unanimity. Although advocates of negotiated 
rulemaking claim otherwise, it is possible to achieve many of the 
275 K ERW IN 2d, supra note 228, at 109. 
276 Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford , Nego tiation as a iv!eans of 
Developing and Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and 
Safety Policy , 23 H ARV. E NVTL. L. R Ev. 141 (1999). 
?.77 !d. at 201. 
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asserted advantages of negoti a ted rulemaking by expanding par-
ticipation in the convention al rulemaking process, all wit hout 
creating the perverse incentives that can arise when policymakers 
seek consensus. 
The choice for agencies is not bet\veen developing rules 
through negotiated rulemaking or developing rules inside a 
closet. Age ncies can , and regularly do , engage the interests af-
fe cted bv rules through individual and collective forms of clia-
~ '-
logue.271' These alternative fo rms of deliberation, be they 
individual meetings, public workshops, or formal advisory com-
mittees, provide the agency with the same kinds of opportuni ties 
fo r public input into regulatory decision making as negotiated 
rulemaking. 27l) But th ey also avoid creating pressures to emph a-
size tractability , accept ambiguity , or descend to th e lowest com -
mon denominator. A fter a ll , it is the deliberation-not the 
consensus- that generates the information that enables agencies 
to craft thei r policy decisions. To the extent that public officials 
already employ participatory processes that enable inte res ted 
parties to share inforrnation , these alternative forum s for delibe r-
at ion within the convention a l rulemaking process can provide 
comparable, if not superior, results. 
H arter and other proponents of negotiated rulema king 
question whether anything short of negotiated r ul emaking will 
clo. 2~0 Harter specifically lauds the averaging approach EPA 
adopted in its reformulated gasoline regulation as a key innova-
ns See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra no te 2, at 1330-31. 
27 LJ In the ir Phase II report. Langbein and Kerwin indicate th a t their res pon-
d ents vievv th e E PA as eq ually respo nsive to publi c input during th e con ven-
ti o nal ru lemak ing process: 
Co nve ntion a l rulem aking respo nd en ts view E PA as ope n to th e ir ideas 
and the rul es the Agency produces as heavily intlue nced by th e public 
parti cipa tion th at does occur. While nego tiated rule making m ay offe r 
slightly greater benefits in terms o f th e efficacy of public p artici pation. 
they are prope rly viewed at best as incremental give n the so lid base of 
public in vo lvement th a t appea rs to have been establi shed by EPA ·s ove r-
all app roac h to ru lemaking. 
Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II. supro note 217 , a t 24. 
2so See . e.g., Harter. Fea r of Commitment. supra note 5. at 1410-11. 141 8-19 
(arguing that consulta ti ve processes other than negotiated rulemakin g fai l to 
achieve as many benefits); Free man & Langbein , supra note 133, at 64. 134 
(expressing doubt that policy delibe ra ti ons short of negotiated rul em aking will 
work as effectively). See also K ER WI N 2d , supra note 228, at 183 (obse rving 
that "advocates of negot ia ted rulemaking are skept ical of partia l substitutes and 
decry th e loss of commitment that goes wi th th em " ). Although advoca tes con -
tinue to cla im that nothi ng short of nego tiated rule making will wo rk ellective ly, 
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tion that was discovered o nly because the rule was negotiatecP~-> 1 
U nder the averaging ap proach, refiners could meet fuel stan-
dards based on th e average applied over entire stocks of fuel re-
fined during the calendar year rather than applied on a per 
gallon basis. 2s2 In return for the additional flexibility that thi s 
ave raging approach provided to refiners , the final rule required 
refin ers to meet a standard that ·was somewhat more stringe nt , 
thus satisfying environmentalists' concerns.283 Harter argues that 
no research has ye t systemat ica ll y to compare negotiated rul emaking with other 
intensive but non-conse nsual effo r ts a t public de li be rat ion . 
2:3 1 See Harter. Assessing rh e Assessors , supra n o te 5. at 50 (asserting that 
" [t]h e fact that the rule had bee n negotiated ... res ulted in a much better 
rul e") . For the text of the reformulated gasolin e rule. see Regulation of Fuels 
and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline . 5CJ 
Feel. Reg. 7716 (Feb. 16. 1094) (to be cod ifi ed a t 40 C.F.R. Part 80). Eel Webe r 
ca lls th e effort leadin g to the pro mul ga tion of th e refor mul a ted gasolin e rul e a 
·'new mode l for regu la ti o n that ca n achi eve mo re effec tive e n vironmenta l r;:: -
sults a t lower costs th a n assoc iated with the acl ve rsaria l approach." Edward P. 
Weber , Successjii/ Co!!obormion: NegOiiming Effecrive Regulations, E NV IRON -
f\. IENT, Nov. 1998. at 10, 11. In reality EPA's reformulated gasoline rul e has 
been o ne of EPA ·s mos t p roblema ti c regulations in recent years. Not only did 
th e rul e result in several ad mini strative and legal challenges, it also generated 
exceptional outcry in th e press a nd led to the first WTO decision striking cl own 
a U.S. reg ul a tion. See Cogli anese, Assessing Consensus, sup ra not e 2 at 1292: 
World Trade Organizat ion. Doc. No . \VT/DS2R, reprimed in World Trade Or-
gan iz.a rion: Reporr of Pone! in United Srares-Srandards for Gasoline , 35 l.L. M. 
274. 279-9 1 (1996). In aclcl iti o n, th e fu e l additive authori zed by the rule . i'VITBE. 
has generated enorm o us controversy as it may be a carcinoge n. The possibility 
that MTBE may enter drinking water if leaked int o gro undwater in various 
parts of th e country has prompted effo rts to ban the future use of the additive. 
See, e.g., Marla Cone, EPA to Ban Gas Additive Nmiomvide. L.A. TirviES, !vlar. 
21, 2000, at A3: Marla Cone, E limination of Additive from Gas is Ordered , L.A. 
TIMES, D ec. 10. 199CJ. a t A3. See also Judith Newman , Twenty of the Gre{[{e.i·r 
Blunders in Science in rh e Lasr Twenty Years, DISCOVER, Oct. 2000, at 78. 83 . 
A t the same time that Harte r clai ms that certain purported ly beneficial aspects 
of the rule ought to be att ributed to nego tiat ed rulemak in g. he also disavows 
a ny connection betwee n nego ti ated rulemaking a ncl th e problems of the rul e . 
See H arter. Assessing rhe Assessors . supra note 5, at 50. However, it is certainly 
plausible that a more aclversaria l process could have res ul ted in a more mea n-
in gful a iring up front of concerns abo ut MTBE ancl th e impact of the rul e on 
foreign refin e rs. and th at th e E PA might well have been more receptive to these 
concerns. Nevertheless, eve n if H a rter were correct th at nego tiated rulemaking 
did not cause the problems with the reformulated gasolin e~ rul e, neither did it 
prevent them . Regulatory negotiation did not cure the malaise in this 
rul e ma king. 
282 Standards for Reformul ated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Feel . R eg. a t 
7721, 7724. 7753-54, 7756-57. 
2i->3 Standards for Re formul ated a nd Conventional Gasol ine, 59 Fe el. R eg. at 
7721. See also Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 57 Feel . 
R eg. 13,416. 13.425 (Apr. 16, 1992) (s upplemental no ti ce of proposed ru!em ak -
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this averaging provision, combined with the somewhat more 
stringent stanclarcl , was a significant innovation th at EPA would 
not have developed had it not been engaged in a negotiated 
rulemaking.284 
EPA officials, though, die! not need negotiated rulemaking in 
order to conceive and adopt such an averaging plan . EPA had 
already adopted high-profile emissions trading policies more 
than a clecacle before the reformulated gasoline rul e, all of which 
rely on averaging, but none of which grew out of negotiated 
rulemakings .285 More specifica lly, EPA's fuel standards relied on 
averaging approaches since at least the 1970s, and averaging was 
integral to the EPA's program for phasing out leaded gasoline in 
the 1980s.286 Moreover. regulators at E PA hardly needed forma l 
negoti ations to tell them that environmental groups would more 
readily support an averaging approach if it was accompanied by 
more stringent stanclarcls . Incleecl, EPA had made the same kine! 
of trade-off in allowing emissions trading and banking for heavy-
duty diesel engines, with a corresponding twenty percent reduc-
tion in standards, fo ur years before its reformulated gasoline 
ing) (describing the more stringen t standa rd s for averaging with the per- gallon 
standards) . 
284 Harter first advanced this argument in re marks delivered at a pane l or-
ga nized around my research at the Associa ti on of A merican L aw Schools meet-
ing on January 9, 1998. See sup ra no te 85. H e repeats in his recent articl e 
essentially the same cla ims about the averaging component o f the reformu la ted 
gasoline rule which he made at th e AALS meeting. Harter, Assessing the Asses-
sors, sup ra note 5, at 50 n.96 (asse rting that the eventual rule res ulted in lower 
stand ards and greate r fl exibility " th an would have emerged from a traditional 
rulemaking") . 
285 For a review of emissions trading and other market-based policies, see 
Robert W. H ahn & R obert N. Stavins, Incenti ve-Based Environmental R egula-
tion: A New Era From an Old Idea, 18 E coLOGY L.Q. 1 (1 991) . Administra tive 
lawyers will be quite familiar with emissions averaging, as such an approach 
unde rgi rd ed the EPA's emissions trading rule which was chall e nged in Chevron, 
U SA , Inc. v. Natura l R eso urces Defense Co uncil, 467 U .S . 837 (1984), reh 'g 
denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984 ). 
286 Robert Hahn & Gordon H es ter , Marketable Permits: L essons for Theo ry 
and Practice, 16 E coLOGY L. Q. 374 (1989) (describing lead-trading rul e's pro-
visions all owing refiners to add more lead to gasoline during certain parts of the 
year and less in others in order to arr ive at a lead level consistent with their 
yearly all owable permits). See also Standards fo r Reformul ated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 59 Fed . Reg. at 7768 ("Lead phasedown was similar to refor-
mula ted gasoline in th at refiners and importers were required to m ee t an 
average standard that applied to gasoline produced or imported. ' ') . 
I 
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rulemaking.287 In all of these earlier cases , EPA officials devel-
oped the same kind of innovation Harter attributes to negotiated 
rulemaking, but they did so using conventional rulemaking 
procedures. 
The more widely used forms of public participation in con-
ventional rulemaking offer regulators the same opportunity to in-
corporate the knowledge and practical experience of the public 
into regulatory decisions-an opportunity that advocates claim 
uniquely for negotiated rulemaking. However, using these alter-
native forms of public participation in conventional rulemaking 
can improve regulatory policy while minimizing the problems 
that arise when consensus becomes the goal for regulatory policy, 
as occurs in negotiated rulemaking. The validity of my conclu-
sion in Assessing Consensus remains undiminished: in the ab-
sence of negotiated rulemaking's promised benefits, "agencies' 
continued reliance on public participation methods which do not 
depend on consensus would appear the more sensible approach 
to making regulatory decisions. ' '288 
CoNcLusroN 
For years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking have put 
forth enthusiastic promises about how negotiated rulemaking 
would reduce litigation and shorten the rulemaking process. 
Philip Harter, in his recent article purporting to assess my empir-
ical study, has continued this line of advocacy for negotiated 
rulemaking. He advances a series of criticisms of my research 
but, as I have explained in this Article, he is simply wrong about 
each of them and about each of the claims he makes in his de-
fense of negotiated rulemaking. H is continued efforts to make a 
case for negotiated rulemaking fail to adhere to the most rudi-
mentary principles of sound empirical analysis, including the use 
of clear criteria, consistency in applying these criteria to both 
treatment and comparison groups, and the inclusion of negative 
as well as positive cases in an empirical evaluation. In effect, 
Harter puts a thumb down on the side of the scale that favors 
negotiated rulemaking, offering a perhaps predictable plea of ad-
287 See Certification Programs for Banking & Trading of Oxides of Nitrogen 
& Particulate Emission Credits for Heavy Duty Engines, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584, 
30,585 (July 26, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 86). 
288 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 5, at 1336. 
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vocacy but not any credible new assessment of negotiated 
rulemaking. 
Despite nearly twenty years of experimentation, negotiated 
rulemaking has yet to achieve a demonstrable reduction in the 
time it takes to develop regulations nor in the frequency or inten-
sity of subsequent litigation over those regulations. Indeed, the 
empirical record shows that negotiated rulemaking actually de-
mands more effort and results in more litigation than other com-
parable rulem aking processes. Had it not been for several 
decades worth of enthusiastic advocacy of negotiated rulemak-
ing. these results vvould probably neither be surprising nor con-
tested. After all, it is bound to take an intensive effort to 
develop a consensus among multiple interests on a proposed 
rule. even for those rules that agenci es find more predisposed to 
success and which are for that reason selected for negotiation in 
the first place. It is similarly unrealistic to expect that negotia-
tion will stave off subsequent litigation, especially when negoti-
ated processes themselves raise expectations and generate 
conflicts over who participates in the negotiat ion and over wbat 
the terms (and silences) in the negotiated agreements mean. 
The finding that negotiated rulemaking neither reduces 
rulemaking time nor prevents litigation could conceivably be 
viewed as somewhat less of a failure if it could be shown that 
negotiated rulemaking systematically led to significantly better 
quality rules. Harter makes such an assertion, but it too is unsup-
ported by the available body of empirical research. The results 
of the Langbein and Kerwin study cited by Harter are not easy to 
interpret, but at best they can be said to show only that partici-
pants in negotiated rulemakings tend to perceive the conven-
tional rulemaking process in terms better than those who file 
comments perceive the conventional rulemaking process. Per-
ceptions on the part of participants in negotiated rulemaking, 
formed as they are after involvement in quite intensive processes, 
are likely explained by factors other than genuine, underlying 
policy improvements. Indeed , there are good reasons to doubt 
that negotiated rulemaking will in fact lead to any systematic im-
provement at all in regulatory policy. Making consensus a pre-
condition for policymaking will only likely exacerbate problems 
such as ambiguity, lowest common denominator results, and an 
undue emphasis on tractability. More significantly, whatever 
benefits negotiated rulemaking might presumably hold in terms 
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of generating information and dialogue over regulatory policy, 
these benefits appear to be just as achievable through alternative 
processes that encourage public participation but which do not 
demand consensus. Negotiated rulemaking's failure to achieve 
its goals of reducing rulemaking time and preventing litigation is 
simply not offset by any demonstrated improvements in the qual-
ity of regulatory policy when compared with other ways of devel-
oping regulations. 
Given that the promises made for negotiated rulemaking 
over the years remain unfulfilled, agency officials seeking to [n-
volve the public in the rulemaking process should continue to 
rely on other processes for developing regulations. Negotiated 
rulemaking demands a concentrated investment of time and re-
sources by all involved, but without any clear corresponding re-
turn in terms of avoiding litigation or achieving other goals. 
Nothing in Harter's latest effort to salvage negotiated rulemak-
L ~ G 
ing diminishes this conclusion. Agency officials, legislators, and 
other observers of the regulatory process would do well to look 
elsewhere for a cure to whatever ills the regulatory process. 
